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I. INTRODUCTION
Granting intellectual property (hereinafter "IP") rights is like
setting a big ship on a straight course: While the course as such may,
on the whole, lead to the aspired goal, corrections may be needed here
and there in order to avoid dangerous or shallow waters. Tradition-
ally, exceptions and limitations are used as tools for such fine-tuning -
they do not challenge protection as such, but adapt its scope to exigen-
cies arising in special, mostly atypical situations. With the advent of
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the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights1 (hereinafter "TRIPS"),
the three-step test was introduced as the international yardstick to be
observed in all areas of IP law with regard to the contents and reach of
limitations and exceptions, thereby restricting the freedom of national
legislatures to create such rules with a view only to their own domestic
situation. Depending on the interpretation of the test, this may jeop-
ardize the capacity of national systems to achieve the desired balance
between protection and countervailing policy interests.
This paper will briefly outline the role and functions of limita-
tions and exceptions within the system of IP law. Furthermore, it will
investigate the origins as well as the current interpretation of the
three-step test, with a critical focus on the evaluation of the WTO-
Panel decisions dealing with Article 13 and Article 30 (and, to some
extent, Article 17 of TRIPS). In addition, it will be explained why and
how the interpretation by the WTO Panels is not doing full justice to
the inherent flexibilities of the test, whose potential for a more bal-
anced understanding in the context of TRIPS and other international
instruments will be set out in the conclusion.
II. DEFINITIONS AND SYSTEMATIC CONSIDERATIONS
1. What is it all about?
It lies in the very nature of IP rights that they are "limited."2
This becomes most obvious in the fact that (with the notable exception
of trademarks 3), the rights expire after a certain period in time. Also
the requirements to be fulfilled in order to obtain protection perform a
limiting function of crucial importance: No patent will be granted for
inventions that are not novel, not inventive enough and/or cannot be
industrially applied; works not meeting the necessary threshold of
originality are not eligible for copyright protection, and signs not capa-
ble of distinguishing goods or services will never become a trademark.
In addition to those general requirements, most IP laws identify spe-
cific subject matter as non-protectable, such as (under EU law) com-
1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
2 See SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 756 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2006) (pointing at the fact
that during the negotiations leading up to the Berne Convention, delegations were
reminded by Numa Droz that "limits to absolute protection are rightly set by the
public interest").
3 The main reason why trademark rights do not expire lies in the fact that they do
not exclude or even restrict competition with regard to the commodity designated
by the mark, but only compel others making the same offer to use a different mark
(which, at least in theory, are in indefinite supply).
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puter programs when it comes to patenting,4 official texts or news of
the day with regard to copyright,5 and, in case of trademarks, shapes
that are necessary to achieve a technical result.6 Finally, the most
complex and differentiated body of limitations is represented by rules
which, in spite of a right being granted (and not having expired), pose
an obstacle for the right holder to enforce it in specific situations - or,
expressed the other way round, rules that function as defences against
claims based on valid, unexpired rights. The classical example of this
situation is the quotation right: Whereas the right to prohibit the re-
production and distribution of the work remains unchallenged as such,
the copyright holder cannot enjoin others from using parts of it for
quotation purposes, to the extent this complies with the requirements
set out in Article 10(1) of the Berne Convention or its counterparts in
national law. It is primarily that latter type of limitations which is
addressed by the three-step test in TRIPS and other international in-
struments, and which will be in the focus of this paper.
The distinction made between limitations operating as
defences and other rules which, though in different ways, likewise
serve to limit the grant and extent of protection, raises several ques-
tions. First, it can be asked whether and in which way a terminologi-
cal distinction should be made between both types of rules. Second -
and, as some would posit, inextricably linked with the first question -
one may inquire whether the classification as a "defence"-type of limi-
tation implies a sort of substantive degradation of such provisions in
comparison to the rules granting protection. From those considera-
tions, a third question may emerge, namely whether the distinction
made above is artificial and/or misguided in the sense that all rules
limiting the ambit of exclusive rights are, or should be, of the same
legal quality.
2. Terminology
Concerning the terminological aspect, no agreement or uniform
practice seems to exist on the international level. For instance, Article
13 of TRIPS uses the terms "exceptions and (or) limitations", seem-
4 Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52(2)(C)-52(3), Oct. 5, 1973,
13 I.L.M. 270, available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/
2000/e/mal [hereinafter European Patent Convention].
5 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as amended, July 14, 1967, art. 5.1, 1971 WL 123138, 828 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
6 Council Directive 89/104, art. 3(1)(e), 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1 (EC); Council Regulation
40/94, art. 7(1)(e)(ii), 1993 O.J. (L 11) 1 (EC) [hereinafter CTMR]; see also 15
U.S.C. §1052(e)(5) (2008) (under U.S. law, a corresponding result would follow
from the doctrine of functionality).
OF OCEANS, ISLANDS, AND INLAND WATER
ingly treating them as synonyms.7 In Articles 17, 26.2 and 30 of
TRIPS, however, the three-step test anchored therein refers to "(lim-
ited) exceptions", thereby inviting the interpretation that "exceptions"
is the more appropriate term to employ with regard to provisions fall-
ing into its ambit.8 Also in the WIPO-study undertaken by Sam Rick-
etson,9 it is suggested that the term "exceptions" be used for rules
which "grant immunity from infringement proceedings for particular
kinds of use" (i.e., the "quotation-type" of rules), whereas "provisions
that exclude, or allow for the exclusion of, particular categories of
works" should be called "limitations."' °
Other scholarly studies seem to disagree about the correct use
and attribution of those terms." Most notably, it has been argued in-
ter alia by Christophe Geiger that the term "exception" appears to im-
ply the view that such rules are inferior in ranking as compared to the
rules granting protection, to the effect that modes of use declared ad-
missible by virtue of exceptions are considered as "islands of freedom
in an ocean of exclusivity."' 2 By referring to "limitations" instead, it
7 See also Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5(1), 2001 O.J. (L 167/10) 1 (EC); MARTIN
SENFrLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAw 22 (2004) (views
the parallel use of both terms in Article 13 of TRIPS as a deliberate choice in order
to encompass the two different copyright traditions, namely the natural rights-
focused continental tradition (where "exception" would be considered as the more
appropriate term), and the utilitarian approach of common law (which would pre-
fer "limitation"))
8 TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 17, 26.2, 30.
9 World Intellectual Property Organization Standing Committee on Copyright
and Related Rights, WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and
Related Rights in the Digital Environment, WIPO Doc. SCCR/9/7 (Apr. 5, 2003)
[hereinafter WIPO Study].
10 But see JORG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 128 (2004)
(suggesting exactly the opposite, namely that "an exception to the right should be
understood to be the farthest-reaching restriction, as it indicates that the right no
longer applies in the particular case in question", whereas a "limitation would re-
strict the right without depriving it of all its content."); see also RIcKETSON & GINS-
BURG, supra note 2, at 756-57 (A distinction is made between "subject matter
limitations" and "use limitations" (with "use limitations requiring compensation"
being listed as a third category)).
11 See Pierre Sirinelli, Exceptions and Limits to Copyright and Neighbouring
Rights (WIPO, Conference Paper, 1999) (giving an overview on the diversities of
terminology); see also Jaap Spoor, General Aspects of Exceptions and Limitations
to Copyright: General Report, in L BAULCH, M GREEN, & M WYBURN, THE BOUNDA-
RIES OF COPYRIGHT: IT'S PROPER LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 29 (1999).
12 Reto M. Hilty & Christophe Geiger, Der urheberrechtliche Interessenausgleich
in der Informationsgesellschaft [The copyright balance of interests in the informa-
tion company] 815, 818 (2005); LucIE GUIBAULT, COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND
20091
292 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 8:3
would become clearer that in reality, protection is to be regarded as"an island of exclusivity in an ocean of freedom." 3
It is true that the psychological importance of terminology
should not be underestimated. However, prevailing attitudes and le-
gal traditions can hardly be influenced, and even less be changed, by
choice of terminology only. In addition, the colorful picture of islands
and the ocean may not be complex enough to capture the specific char-
acter of the rules considered here. If IP rights in general are consid-
ered islands in a sea of freedom, the rules granting immunity for
certain kinds of use, i.e. the "quotation-type" of limitations, might
more adequately be described as pools of water forming within the is-
land. The question whether the inland water is substantially different
from the element surrounding the island may not always find a crys-
tal-clear answer. Differences may exist - one is salty, whereas the
other is often sweet, and both could be home to different kinds of fish.
On the other hand, the essential point remains to be that water is not
a surface on which houses can be built and crops can be harvested.
Leaving allegories aside, it seems that a crucial commonality
exists between, on the one hand, the rules addressed in this paper and
those governing the general boundaries of IP rights on the other, inso-
far as both command freedom of access to, and use of protected subject
matter. Nevertheless, "quotation-type" limitations can regularly be
distinguished from general protection requirements or subject matter
exclusions by their specific position within the system, 14 where they
are treated as defence rather than as part of the claim. Accordingly, it
seems that while arguments can be found for both sides, no cogent rea-
sons exist for insisting on one or the other terminological choice.'" It is
therefore a matter of working convenience rather than expressing a
political statement, if this paper mainly, though not exclusively uses
the term "limitation" for the "quotation-type" of rules, while the term"exception" is treated as a basically valid synonym. For clarification
purposes, provisions ab initio excluding from protection of certain sub-
ject matter, like computer programs or official works, will be ad-
dressed as "exclusions."
CONTRACTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRACTUAL OVERRIDABILITY OF LIMITATIONS ON
CONTRACT 17 (Kluwer Law Int'l 2002); see also Spoor, supra note 11, at 29-31.
13 Hilty & Geiger, supra note 12, 815, 818-19; Christope Geiger, Flexibilising Cop-
yright - Remedies to Privitisation of Information by Copyright Law, 39 INT'L R.
INTELL. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 178, 193 (2008).
14 ACHIM FORSTER, FAIR USE 3 (Mohr Siebeck 2008).
15 Id. at 5.
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3. Islands in an ocean of protection, or vice versa?
Whereas the terminological aspect as such does not appear to
be of major importance, the ranking of limitations in the structure of
IP rights forms a key aspect of IP policy. Two antagonistic views, clad
in the picture of islands of freedom in an ocean of exclusivity or vice
versa, were addressed above. In a somewhat simplified way, the thesis
usually transported with that image contends that the first of these
views, i.e. preponderance of exclusive protection over exceptions and
limitations, corresponds to the attitude currently prevailing in IP cir-
cles, whereas the second approach with its accent on freedom would be
a more appropriate tool for creating an IP system that is truly benefi-
cial to society.' 6
For a closer analysis, the thesis can be divided into two parts.
First, that there is no structural difference between rules formulated
as exceptions and limitations and other rules limiting the potential
ambit of exclusive rights, like the provisions governing the require-
ments for protection. Second, that in any case, limitations and excep-
tions should not be treated as "inferior" in ranking, in the sense that
they are applied more narrowly than the provisions on which a claim
for protection is based.
Concerning the first-mentioned aspect, limitations and excep-
tions are typically different from requirements for (or exclusions from)
protection insofar as they regularly apply only after a right has been
granted in the first place. However, that is not the only difference, nor
is it actually crucial for the distinction. More decisive than that seems
to be the way in which the burden of pleading is allocated to the par-
ties of a conflict. If a particular element needs to be established by the
plaintiff in order to make a valid claim, it forms part of the substantive
requirements. However, where a specific obstacle hinders the enforce-
ment of a claim whose validity has been established in principle, the
burden to establish its existence is regularly on the defendant.
Whether a rule belongs to one or the other category is not nec-
essarily determined by its substantive content and objectives. For in-
stance, in trademark and patent law alike, private uses do not fall into
the ambit of the rights conferred. However, in (European) trademark
law, the requirement of commercial use forms part of the claim,
whereas in patent (and industrial design) law, use for private purposes
16 Hilty & Geiger, supra note 12, 815, 818; see also Christope Geiger, De la nature
juridique des limites du droit d'auteur [Of the juridical nature of the borders of the
copyright], 13 PROP. INTELL. 882 (2004); Reto. M. Hilty, Siindenbock Urheberrecht?
[Copyright Scapegoat?] in DIETHELM KLIPPEL & ANsGAR OHLY, GEISTIGES EIGEN-
TUM UND GEMEINFREIHEIT [Spiritual Property and Common Freedom] 107, 110
(2007), citing WILLIAM RODOLPH CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OMNIPRESENT;
DISTRACTING; IRRELEVANT? 113 (2004).
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is part of the defence. It seems to comply with a general understand-
ing - and is endorsed as the point of departure for this paper - that
(only) the latter rule constitutes a limitation in a strict legal sense. 7
The distinction is therefore a matter of legal construction - how has
the element been integrated into the corpus of legal rules governing
the conflict? In civil law systems, that question would have to be an-
swered with a view to the structure of the legal text and the position
assigned to the relevant provision therein. While such an analysis
does not always lead to conclusive results,'" it usually furnishes a reli-
able basis for characterizing a given rule as part of the claim or as a
defence. Correspondingly, in the common law system, the relevant in-
dication would have to be found in jurisprudence.
If that scheme is accepted as a general basis, it follows that the
party invoking a limitation has indeed the "disadvantage" of having to
bear the burden of pleading and, where that is of relevance, of adduc-
ing factual evidence. The practical importance of that effect should not
be underestimated. However, as a purely "technical" consequence, it is
due to general considerations of procedural efficiency and convenience
rather than expressing specific attitudes or policies, or even implying
negative value judgments.
To be distinguished from the structural analysis and its proce-
dural consequences is the issue addressed in the second part of the
contention set forth above, namely that to conceive of a rule as a de-
fence is often regarded as reflecting a pattern of rule and exemption,
thereby regularly compelling a narrow interpretation of the latter.
However - and with reservations to be made regarding legal systems
this author is not aware of-, it appears that the methodological rule, if
it ever existed, nowadays is generally considered as flawed and obso-
lete. Rather than applying a schematic approach of rule and exemp-
tion, each legal provision, whether constituting a claim or a defence,
must be interpreted in accordance with the aim and purpose expressed
17 See P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji, Conceiving an International Instru-
ment on Limitations and Exceptions 19 (Open Society Institute, 2008); available at
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/information/articles-publications/publications
copyright_20080506/copyright_20080506.pdf (It is noteworthy that the concept of
limitations and exceptions until now has not been thoroughly explored, at least
not on the international level. The issue is indeed of some relevance for the ques-
tion which types of rules are subject to the three-step test).
18 See Directive 2001/29, supra note 7, art. 5(1) (The term "exempted" is used,
which usually indicates that the purpose is to exclude the acts mentioned ab initio,
whereas the general chapeau of the provision is "Limitations and Exceptions". Re-
maining within the image used above, this can be compared to a situation when it
is impossible to tell whether what looks like a lake is in reality an inlet from the
open sea).
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therein.19 The principle has been adequately described by pointing out
that interpretation of limitations must neither be narrow nor broad -
it must quite simply be "correct".
It is still another question, however, whether in a particular
legal system, superiority is generally and deliberately assigned to pro-
tecting interests as compared to countervailing values, in particular to
freedom of competition access and use. This is a legal policy choice
that basically every legislature is entitled to make for itself. Whether
or not a legal system adopts such a rule will typically depend on over-
arching considerations, quite often founded on a constitutional back-
ground. For instance, the German Constitutional Court has declared
that as a matter of principle, authors must be able to draw benefits
from each and every exploitation of their work.2 ° As long as that deci-
sion stands as an authoritative interpretation of constitutional law, it
can hardly be argued, with regard to the German system, that in case
of doubt, aspects of free competition must regularly be given prefer-
ence.21 Vice versa, in systems where IP protection is based on purely
utilitarian considerations, 22 with the aim of fostering dynamic compe-
tition being in the foreground, the postulate that free access and use
should prevail unless a clear case can be made for the appropriateness
of protection fits smoothly into the picture.
III. LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS IN COMMON LAW AND
CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS (OVERVIEW)
1. General remarks
Whereas limitations and exceptions can be found in all fields of
IP law, it is the area of copyright and related rights that offers the
richest variety of such rules. In addition, it is with regard to copyright
19 See FORSTER, supra note 14, at 107; see also. FRANz BYDLINSKI, GRUNDZOGE DER
JURISTISCHEN METHODENLEHRE [Main features of the juridical method apprentice-
ship] 81 (2005); CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS & KARL LAREN, METHODENLEHRE DER
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [Method of jurisprudence apprenticeship], 175 (1999);
RALPH CHRISTENSEN & FRIEDRICH MOLLER, JURISITISCHE METHODIK [Juridical
Methodology], vol. I, n.373 (2004).
20 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [German Constitutional Court] 229
Entschcidungen des Bundesrerfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 481, 1972 (F.R.G.).
21 Compare Forster, supra note 14, at 183, with Thomas Hoeren, Urheberrecht in
der Informationsgesellschaft [Copyright in the Information Society] 866, 869 (Ger-
man Association for Industrial Property and Copyright Law 1997), and Hilty,
supra note 16, at 107, 111, 122 (however, as an appeal to re-think and change the
currently prevailing choice of legal policy, the pro-competition arguments retain
their value).
22 This applies in particular to the American system. See SENFLTBEN, supra note
7, at 14; FORSTER, supra note 14, at 9.
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and related rights that the differences existing between civil law and
common law systems (as represented by European and American law
respectively) are the most prominent. This is reflected in two distinct
features characterizing and distinguishing the systems from one an-
other: First, whereas civil law systems traditionally favour enumera-
tive and conclusive catalogues of limitations, United States copyright
law contains an open "fair use" clause that is applied on a case by case
basis by the courts.2 3 Second, whereas under United States copyright
law, to decide in favour of "fair use" means that the use made is in fact
free, civil law countries often choose a "middle route" by making use
admissible against payment of remuneration - a technique also apos-
trophised as "licenses by law."
2. "Fair use" vs. closed catalogues
The virtues and drawbacks of a fair use clause in comparison to
a closed catalogue of limitations have often been examined.2 4 It is ob-
vious that one has the advantage of flexibility, which becomes increas-
ingly important in an age of rapid technological change, while the
other is superior in terms of legal security and reliability. The issue
has incited renewed interest in the context of TRIPS and the WCT/
WPPT,25 with the argument being raised that judge-made exceptions
based on "fair use" would not live up to the standard of certainty com-
pelled by the three-step test.2 6 However, though the argument cannot
be taken lightly, most authors have come to the conclusion that the
fair use clause in its application by United States' courts does not fail
to meet the requirements under international law.2 7
23 WIPO Study, supra note 9, at 73 (presenting Australian copyright as a third
model, which combines features of the other two. It includes many detailed excep-
tions, but also some rather broad provisions reflecting the U.S. fair use-formula.
As Ricketson puts it, the result "is a patchwork of exceptions and compulsory li-
censes that has come about by a steady process of accretion accommodation of con-
flicting interests, and it is not always easy to see a coherent set of principles that
underlies the whole". On the other hand, it is also stressed that the law becomes
more transparent and easier to analyze).
24 See, e.g., FORSTER, supra note 14.25 See generally Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the
United States: Will Fair Use Survive? 21 EUR. INT. PROP. REV. 236 (1996).26 See Jehoram H. Cohen, Einge Grundatze zu den Ausnahem im Urheberrecht
[Some Principles to the Exceptions in Copyright] 807, 808 (German Association for
Industrial Property and Copyright Law 2001); Joachim Bornkamm, Der Dreis-
tufentest als urheberrechtliche Schrankenbestimmung - Karriere eines Begriffs
[The 3 step test as a copyright barrier regulation - career of a concept] in Hans-
JUrgen Ahrens et al., Festschrift ffir Willi Erdmann [Commemorative Writing for
Willi Erdmann], 29, 45-46 (2002) (Each provided negative responses).27 See SENFrLEBEN, supra note 7, at 162; FORSTER, supra note 14, at 191.
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Without being able to examine the issue more thoroughly, that
result appears plausible. It must be considered that in spite of United
States jurisprudence insisting on a strictly case-oriented approach, the
common law rules ensuring the binding power of precedents in general
do provide for a certain amount of legal security. Notwithstanding the
fact that the suggestion to formulate certain "bright line rules" is con-
stantly rejected, Unites States' courts do apply the pattern of factors
set out in Section 107 of the Copyright Act in the way it has been ex-
plored and developed in the leading cases,2" thereby offering a rela-
tively stable basis for parties to plead their case and structure their
arguments. Finally, Section 107 is complemented in practice by a
number of guidelines29 as well as by specific and rather detailed stat-
utes in particular fields.3"
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the United States copy-
right system is considerably more flexible with regard to limitations
than its European counterpart. This may result in a more reserved
attitude vis-d-vis the exercise of exclusive rights, as has become visible
in some of the more recent decisions.3 It is also undeniable that the
richness and fragmentation of United States case law render it diffi-
cult to attain a comprehensive picture. Furthermore, studies compar-
ing decisions that appear to pertain to closely similar cases have
revealed a considerable amount of inconsistencies.32 Notwithstanding
the generally positive view taken on the fair use clause and its compat-
ibility with the three-step test, the question therefore lingers on
whether the present degree of flexibility will remain unaffected by a
tightened regime operating on the international level.33
28 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2008); see, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 576-93 (1994); Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539, 552-64, 568-69 (1984); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1984).
29 See generally Kenneth Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair Use
Guidelines, 62 OHIo ST. L.J. 599 (2001) (providing a detailed, and critical, account
of fair use guidelines).
30 This was the case also in the conflict brought before the WTO panel. See infra
Part V.4.
31 See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); Kelly v. Ariba Soft, 336
F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
32 See, e.g., David Nimmer, The Public Domain Fairest of Them All, and Other
Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2003).
33 WIPO Study, supra note 9, at 68-69 (concluding that it is quite possible that
any specific judicial application of Section 107 will comply with the three-step test
as a matter of fact, but that "the real problem.. .is with a provision framed in such
a general and open-ended way", and concluding that issues may be raised with
regard to the first and third steps).
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The civil law systems represented by EU Member States
clearly appear more stable and calculable in comparison. However,
they provide no guarantee for a strictly uniform application of the law.
Whenever legal notions are involved that are open for normative as-
sessment, it can and will occur that judges interpret its meaning dif-
ferently, thereby warranting outcomes that might appear inconsistent.
As judges in a civil law system typically do not give full account of the
deliberations leading to one or the other conclusion, but instead postu-
late that "this is what the law says," the possibility for parties to know
beforehand which aspect will become decisive can be quite dim. Fur-
thermore, where the result dictated by an unequivocally worded stat-
ute would strongly contradict a judge's sense of equity and fairness,
resort is sometimes taken to general, overarching principles like con-
stitutional freedoms or rules extracted from other legal fields, like an-
titrust or unfair competition. While such reactions may be
understandable and welcome in the individual case, they are also lia-
ble to undermine the trust in the reliability and self-sufficiency of legal
statutes, which lies at the heart of the civil law system. This has
sometimes been described as a symptom of the fact that existing, con-
clusive catalogues of limitations are necessarily proving insufficient
due to the dynamism of technological and economic development in
connection with the increasing complexity of legal rules.3 4 The propo-
sal has therefore been advanced that, instead of forcing courts to look
for solutions outside the proper legislation, the catalogues should be
complemented by a clause allowing for application in similar cases,
thereby bringing the European system a bit closer to the American
approach. 3 5
It is an open question whether such tentative moves towards a
higher degree of flexibility would be contravened, or rather en-
couraged, 36 by the three-step test which has been expressly integrated
into European copyright law as a requirement to be observed along
31 See Annette Kur, Funktionswandel von Schutzrechten: Ursachen und Konse-
quenzen der inhaltlichen Annaherung und tiberlagerung von Schutzrechtstypen
[Functional Change of Protective Rights: Causes and Consequences of the Content
Approach and Overlapping of Protective Right Types], in GERHARD SCHRICKER ET
AL., GEISTIGES EIGENTUM IM DIENST DER INNOVATION [Spiritual Property in the
Service of Innovation] 23, 49 (2002); Bernt Hugenholtz, Why the Copyright is Un-
important, and Possibly Invalid, 2000 EUR. INTELL. PROP. R. 499, 500 (2000).
35 FORSTER, supra note 14, at 211; Sirinelli, supra note 11, at 18; Hoeren, supra
note 21, at 886, 871; see ROBERT BURRELL & ALLISON COLEMEN, COPYRIGHT EXCEP-
TIONS: THE DIGITAL IMPACT 249 (2005) (providing a comparative discussion of U.S.
and UK law advocating more flexible application of limitations).
36 A bold step in the direction of a "European Fair Use Clause" in copyright was
taken by the Barcelona Appeal court, decision of 17 September 2008. See infra
Part V.5.b.
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with, or in addition to, the "classical" limitation catalogues.3 7 In partic-
ular, it is unclear whether courts38 will, in the light of the test, apply
an even stricter and narrower way of construing the explicit limita-
tions set out in the law than what would result from traditional meth-
ods of interpretation.3 9
3. "All or nothing" vs. remuneration rights
No indication exists for an approximation of approaches in re-
gard of the second distinguishing feature mentioned above, i.e. the
question whether limitations allow for use that is free of charge or
whether in certain cases, they only restrict the exclusive right in the
sense that no permission by the right holder is needed, but obliging the
user to pay a fair remuneration. 40 The reluctance of, in particular, the
American copyright system to implement such a solution has many
reasons. First, it may seem contradictory to subject use which was
found to be "fair" to an obligation for payment. Second, replacing ex-
clusivity by a remuneration right may recall the concept of compulsory
licences (which is indeed what such regulations are sometimes
called),4 1 that traditionally evokes strong misgivings in IP law. Fi-
nally, the administration of such rights undeniably creates transaction
costs, which are deemed undesirable from an economic point of view.
In a worst case-scenario, both right holders and users may either lose
or gain nothing in the trade, while nourishing a rich and self-endors-
ing layer of intermediate institutions.
From a European viewpoint, however, legal limitations, com-
pensated by remuneration due to the authors and/or right holders, are
considered a welcome and useful mechanism for fine-tuning the bal-
ance between protection and free use. This concerns, in particular,
mass markets or other situations when it is practically impossible to
37 Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 7, art. 5(5); Council Directive 96/9 1996
O.J. (L 77) 15 (EC); Council Directive 911250, art. 6, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 1 (EEC);
SENFrLBEN, supra note 7, at 245.
38 SENFLEBEN, supra note 7, at 270; Christope Geiger, The Three-Step Test, a
Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law? 37 INT'L R. INTELL. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 683,
689 (2006).
39 See Cass. le civ., Feb. 28, 2006, Bull. Civ. I, No. 549 (Case Nos. 05-15.824 & 05-
16.002) (Fr.) (edited translation available in 37 INT'L R. INTELL. PROP. & COPY-
RIGHT 670 (2006)); see also Geiger, supra note 38 (providing a critical commentary).
40 The question has been posed as to whether such "remuneration rights" can at
all be considered as a type of "limitations and exceptions" falling under the three-
step test. See Hugenholtz & Okediji, supra note 17, at 19, n.63. However, to deny
that question would hardly appear as a tenable position - even though the right
holder is compensated, the right is derobed of its basically characteristic element
of exclusivity.
41 WIPO study, supra note 9, at 4.
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monitor and enforce individual rights, but where economic benefits to
the right holder shall still be ensured. The philosophy has also left an
imprint on the Berne and Rome Conventions, where Member States
are given leeway to declare certain modes of use as non-exclusive,
under the condition that fair remuneration is paid. Also when the
three-step test was introduced in 1967, the chairman of Committee I,
Eugen Ulmer, put forward the idea that the question of whether a par-
ticular use constituted "unreasonable prejudice" to authors depended
inter alia on the remuneration that might (or might not) be offered.4 2
Although this position was later criticized as an "unjustified interpola-
tion" to Article 9.2 of the Berne Convention, 43 Ricketson and Ginsburg
point out that Ulmer's statement remained without objection and was
adopted as part of the Committee's report, which constitutes an "au-
thentic supplementary aid to interpretation."44
Indeed, the argument that reducing the scope of exclusive
rights does not (necessarily) mean that such use is free of central im-
portance in the arsenal of those who strongly endorse a more proactive
approach of courts and legislatures towards the creation of new, or
broadening of existing, limitations. 45 The position is bolstered by the
fact that, depending on the legal construction, such remuneration
rights may be constructed as (unalienable) entitlements accruing di-
rectly to the original creators 4 6-the authors-thus proving more ben-
eficial for their interests than a full exclusive right, which will often be
transferred to derivative right holders ("exploiters").47 The point was
expressly emphasized in recent decisions by the German Federal Su-
preme Court,48 as well as by the Supreme Court of Switzerland and
42 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 775 (citing RECORDS OF THE STOCK-
HOLM REVISION CONFERENCE 1967, vol. I, 1145-46) (stating that Ulmer's state-
ment was obviously inspired by the levy system introduced in the (then) new
German copyright act of 1965 as a source of remuneration for private copying).
43 Id. (citing HENRI DESBOIS ET AL., LES CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONALES DU DROIT
D'AUTEUR ET DES DROITS VOISINS [THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF THE RIGHT
OF AUTHOR AND RIGHTS OF NEIGHBORS] 207 (1976)).
44 Id. (referring to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]).
45 KLIPPEL & OHLY, supra note 16, at 107, 121, 123.
46 See e.g., Council Directive 2006/115, art. 5, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 1 (EC) (stating
that it is characteristic for such legal constructions that they are subject to
mandatory collective management); see also infra note 48.
47 The potential divergence of interests between the original copyright owners
("authors") and derivative right holders ("exploiters"), is one of the characteristics
of modern copyright. Cf. Hilty, supra note 16, at 113; see also A Balanced Interpre-
tation of the "Three-Step Test" in Copyright Law, 39 INT'L R. INTELL. PROP. & COPY-
RIGHT 707, 708 (2008).
48 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 11, 2002, I ZR 255
(F.R.G.).
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the chairman of Committee I, Eugen Ulmer;49 it has become a con-
stant factor in legal policy debates.
Of course, it is not ignored that administration of remuneration
rights creates its own transaction costs. However, the drawbacks this
implies are generally considered manageable. The necessary infra-
structure is provided by collective rights management societies who
traditionally assume a strong position in (continental) European copy-
right law.5 ° More recently, the positive picture has become somewhat
blurred. 'While collective administration societies tend to present
themselves as strongholds of cultural diversity and social responsibil-
ity, they have come under attack for allegedly encrusted structures
and lack of transparency in their dealings with authors and users.5 1
In addition, frictions emerge from the fact that digital rights manage-
ment makes it possible for right holders to employ pay-per-use busi-
ness models. The question whether and how such schemes can be
reconciled with traditional ways of procuring payment by collecting so-
cieties is currently among the much-debated topics in European copy-
right law.5 2
Another aspect to be considered, in connection with the middle
route offered by limitations against payment of remuneration, is
whether such solutions would, in the long run, stifle rather than pro-
mote flexibility as a dynamic concept, given that, as a rule, obligations
for payment would need a secure basis in detailed statutes. Finally, it
should be noted that until recently remuneration rights seem to be an
established feature only in copyright, if at all. They are practically
49 Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] May 21, 2007, Entscheidungen des
Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE] 133 (F.R.G.); Bundesgericht [BGer] [Fed-
eral Court] June 26, 2007, No 4C73/2007, available in 39 INT'L R. INTELL. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT 990 (2008); see also Christophe Geiger, Rethinking Copyright Limita-
tions in the Information Society - The Swiss Supreme Court Leads the Way, 39
INT'L R. INTELL. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 943 (2008).
50 The paramount importance of collective rights management organizations in
this context is reflected inter alia in the fact that for some remuneration rights,
collective management is mandatory according to domestic copyright law. See
generally Silke v. Lewinski, Mandatory Collective Administration of Exclusive
rights - a case Study on its Compatibility with International and EC Copyright
law, UNESCO E-COPYRIGHT BULLETIN, Jan.-Mar. 2004 available at http://portal.
unesco.org/culturelen/files/19552/11515904771svle.pdf/svl-e.pdf (examining and
denying the question whether this modality of exercise falls under the three-step
test).
51 Commission Recommendation, 2005 O.J. (L 276) 55; see also Commission Deci-
sion of 16 July 2008, COMP/38698 (CISAC) (prohibiting contractual practices of 24
collecting societies allegedly violating Article 81 EC).
52 See, e.g., Silke von Lewinski, Stakeholder Consultation on Copyright Levies in a
Converging World, 38 INT'L R. INTELL. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 65 (2007).
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unknown in other fields of IP where a need for more flexibility might
likewise occur.
IV. LIMITATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
(OVERVIEW)
1. The Berne Convention
As international instruments in the field of IP are traditionally
founded on the concept of minimum protection granted to the right
holder, it appears natural that they are usually not concerned with the
way in which those rights should be limited. However, there are ex-
ceptions to that rule, the large majority of them concerning copy-
right.5 3 In particular, the Berne Convention is relatively rich with
examples for limitations that Member countries may provide. 4 Con-
cerning the quotation right, the provision is even clad in mandatory
language:5" Such use shall be permissible if the further requirements
set out in the article are fulfilled.5 6
Other limitations in the Berne Convention are optional; in
part, they foresee that the authors in any case remain entitled to a
claim for fair remuneration. A prominent example of an optional limi-
tation is, of course, Article 9.2, the first codification of the three-step
test, regarding the reproduction right. 7 Additionally, Article 10.2 per-
mits the use of literary or artistic works for teaching purposes to the
extent this is compatible with fair practices."8 Article 10bis.1 allows
legislatures to permit reproduction of articles published in newspapers
or periodicals on current events, in case that reproduction has not been
expressly reserved, and that the source is cited.5 9 Article 10bis.2 gives
a basis for allowing reproduction and making available to the public
for purposes of news reporting literary or artistic works seen or heard
in the course of current events.60 Regarding the entitlements under
the broadcasting right anchored in Article llbis.1, the Berne Conven-
tion even leaves it to member states to determine the conditions under
53 See generally Hugenholtz & Okediji, supra note 17.
51 See RIcKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 759, §§ 13.03-39.55 See Annette Kur & Henning Gro~e Ruse-Khan, Enough is Enough - The Notion
of Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection (Max Planck
Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition & Tax Law Research Paper Series No. 09-
01) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1326429 (pro-
viding more information on mandatory limitations, and in particular on Article
10.1 Berne Convention).
56 Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 3.
57 Id. art. 9.
58 Id. art. 10.
59 Id. art. lObis.
60 Id.
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which those rights can be exercised, thus leaving considerable freedom
to legislatures to introduce limitations applying within their own terri-
tory.61 However, the reservation is made that the moral rights of the
author must be respected and his right to obtain equitable remunera-
tion shall not be prejudiced thereby.62 Furthermore, in Article llbis.3
it is stipulated that whereas the recording of broadcasts as a matter of
principle is not implied in permission given for the broadcast as such,
so-called ephemeral recordings are permissible if foreseen by national
legislation.6 3 In addition, the so-called minor reservations doctrine
may be mentioned here as a generally accepted basis for de minimis
types of limitations that are not expressly mentioned in Article
1ibis.64 Finally, Article 13.1 allows countries to introduce reserva-
tions and conditions where the authors of music and lyrics have con-
sented to the recording of the words and the music together, subject to
the right to obtain equitable remuneration.65 In effect, countries may
therefore set up non-voluntary license schemes (remuneration rights)
for the sound recordings of such works.
In addition to the limitations just mentioned, the Berne Con-
vention also excludes, or allows the exclusion of, certain subject matter
ab initio from copyright protection. A mandatory rule, which is how-
ever generally believed to be a clarification, is set out in Article 2.8
where it is stipulated that protection "shall not apply to news of the
day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of
press information."66 More important are Article 2.2, which leaves it
to the member states to restrict copyright protection to works that
have been fixed in a material form, and Article 2.4, allowing for exclu-
sion of official texts of a legislative, administrative and legal nature,
and of translations of such texts.67
2. TRIPS; WCT; WPPT
Exclusions as to certain subject matter can also be found in the
copyright part of TRIPS as well as in the WCT. Both treaties exclude
ideas, procedures, methods of operation and mathematical concepts 68
as well as data per se.69
61 Id. art. l1bis.
62 Id.
63 Copyright Panel Report, infra note 101, 6.90, 6.158
64 See infra Parts V.2 & V.7(b)(ii).
65 Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 13.
66 Id. art. 2.
67 Id.
68 See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 9.2; WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 2 Decem-
ber 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 ILM 65 [hereinafter WCTI.
69 See, e.g., TRIPS supra note 1, art. 10.2; WCT supra note 68, art. 5.
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3. The Rome Convention
The Rome Convention is already less comprehensive than the
Berne Convention with regard to the minimum rights members need
to grant to performing artists, producers and broadcasting companies.
Accordingly, those rights may be limited ab initio in certain aspects,
e.g. concerning the broadcast or public performance of sound record-
ings that have been released on the market. In such cases, however, it
is stipulated in Article 12 Rome Convention that remuneration must
be paid to the performer, the producer, or to both.7 ° Optional limita-
tions and exceptions from the minimum rights provided by the Rome
Convention are found in Article 15.1.71 This concerns the right to pri-
vate use, use of brief excerpts in connection with news reporting,
ephemeral fixations in connection with broadcasting, and use for
teaching or scientific purposes. In addition, national legislatures are
free to extend limitations that are admissible under the Berne Conven-
tion with regard to works of copyright, also to the rights of performers,
producers, and broadcasting organizations.
4. Industrial Property: The Paris Convention
Compared with copyright law and related rights, the interna-
tional instruments heretofore existing in the field of industrial prop-
erty hardly offer any example for limitations and exceptions. Rather
than reflecting a particularly restrictive attitude, however, this is pri-
marily due to the fact that by contrast to Article 2 Berne Convention,
the Paris Convention only makes reference to the subject matter it in-
tends to cover, without defining what shall constitute a patent, a
trademark, etc., and without determining the requirements under
which protection must, in general, be granted.7 2 It is, therefore, left to
the member states to define and regulate those conditions, which im-
plies the freedom to exclude certain subject matter from protection.
The same applies to the limitation of rights granted; as the Paris Con-
vention-by contrast to the Berne Convention-does not undertake
the regulation of the contents and scope of rights conferred by the title
of a patent or trademark, there is no pertinent need to address the
issue of limitations.
However, some exceptions can still be found. Most remarkably,
this concerns Article 5ter Paris Convention, which stipulates in a
mandatory form that the use of patented devices onboard vessels or
70 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phono-
grams and Broadcasting Organizations, art. 12, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43
[hereinafter International Convention for the Protection of Performers].
71 Id. art. 15.
72 See generally Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Sept.
28, 1979, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
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the use of such devices in the construction or operation of aircraft and
land vehicles shall not be considered as patent infringement if the ves-
sel, aircraft, or land vehicle is of another country and only temporarily
or accidentally enters the territory of a country where the patent en-
joys protection.73 This clause reflects the general opinion of the states
represented in the Paris Assembly that ensuring free movement of ve-
hicles is a more important goal than enforcing a protected patent in a
situation which, after all, will hardly cause any significant harm to the
patent holder.74 Other examples of mandatory limitations cited in the
Hugenholtz & Okediji study concern the mandatory invalidation of
trademarks that interfere with protected symbols (including the
Olympic symbol where a country is member to the Nairobi treaty), and
in case of conflict with well-known marks in the meaning of Article
6bis Paris Convention.75 However, in regards to the latter, the rule is
about resolving a conflict between two distinct (private) parties claim-
ing a right to the same item and does not fit into the scheme of limita-
tions seeking to secure access for persons who do not claim to have a
superior title in that very right.76
V. MORE PARTICULAR ON THE THREE-STEP TEST
1. How the test took centre-stage
It follows from the overview just given that international law
heretofore has contained very few provisions dealing with limitations
and exceptions and that most of them are tailored for specific situa-
tions. The picture changed dramatically when, among the many
mixed blessings that TRIPS has brought upon the international IP
community, the three-step test was installed as a general yardstick
against which limitations and exceptions must be measured in all
fields of IP.
73 Id. art. 5ter.
74 G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, PARISER VERBANDSOBEREINKUNFT ZUM SCHUTZ DES
GEWERBLICHEN EIGENTUMS [PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUS-
TRIAL PROPERTY] 69, 339, 577 (1968) (refererring to the minutes of the Revision
Conference at Den Haag (1925)).7 Hugenholtz & Okediji, supra note 17, app. B.76 However, if the term "limitations" is understood in a broader sense, protection
of marks that are not "prior rights" in the usual sense (like well-known marks)
might figure in a scheme of limitations, see Kur & Ruse-Khan supra note 55, at
19-21. Lastly, regarding exclusion ab initio, reference is made by Hugenholtz &
Okediji to Article 52 and 53 EPC that exclude certain types of inventions from
protection. Hugenholtx & Okediji, supra note 17, app. B. However, as the EPC is
rather atypical regarding the dense texture of its provisions (resembling a piece of
national legislation rather than an international text), it is left out of considera-
tion here.
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Regarding industrial property, the insertion of express provi-
sions into TRIPS on the admissibility of limitations constitutes a corol-
lary to the fact that, contrary to the Paris Convention, TRIPS contains
definitions of protectable subject matter and undertakes to determine
the minimum level of rights conferred.7 7 Therefore, it appeared neces-
sary to define the conditions under which countries might derogate
(partly) from the obligations thus imposed. On the other hand, regard-
ing copyright, the fact that WTO Member States were already bound
to the Berne Convention implied a certain amount of regulation con-
cerning limitations and exceptions, so that it might have been suffi-
cient if, following the example of previous Berne provisions, specific
exceptions had been coined only with regard to newly introduced sub-
ject matter such as computer programs and data compilations. It
seems that the first draft for a limitations provision to be included into
TRIPS did pursue that route,7 8 but was later abandoned, probably for
reasons of convenience.7 9
When it comes to the interpretation of the three-step test,
much weight is attributed to the three WTO panel reports dealing with
the issue in patent, copyright, and trademark law.s ° Indeed, the inter-
pretation undertaken by the panels at times appears to be regarded
world-wide as a quasi-canonical exegesis of the respective TRIPS arti-
cles. However, that view does not go unchallenged.8 ' Also in the fol-
lowing, an attempt is made to show that the way in which the three-
step test has been interpreted by the WTO-Panels is by no means
strictly warranted in light of the history, structure, and wording of the
provisions.
77 On the previous situation under the Paris Convention, see supra Part IV.4.
78 UNCTAD/ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT, Copyright
chapter, 2.2.1 (quoting Chairman's report to the Group of Negotiation on Goods,
document MTN.GNG/NG1l/W/76, of 23 July 1990).79 Id.; see also WIPO study, supra note 9, at 65.
80 See infra Part V.4.
81 See, e.g., Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 113 (2000); David J. Brennan, The Three-Step Frenzy - Why
the TRIPS Panel Decision might be considered Per Incuriam, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q.
212, 223 (2002); Kamiel J. Koelman, Fixing the Three-Step Test, 28 EUROPEAN IN-
TELL. PROP. REV. 407 (2006); Geiger, supra note 38, at 683; Christophe Geiger,
Right to Copy v. Three-Step Test: The Future of the Private Copy Exception in the
Digital Environment, 6 COMPUTER L. REV. INT'L 7, 12 (2005).
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2. Provenance of the three-step test
Article 9.2 Berne Convention, the provision which became the
template for TRIPS as well as for corresponding provisions in the WCT
and WPPT,12 reads as follows:
"It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the
Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain
special cases, provided that such reproduction does not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author. 8 3
The insertion of the three-step test into the Berne Convention is of
relatively recent date - it was only added, together with the reproduc-
tion right, at the Stockholm Revision Conference of 1967.84 Before
that, discussions at the Brussels Revision conference (1948) concern-
ing the anchoring of the public performance right in the Berne Con-
vention had led to the recognition of the so-called "minor reservations"
doctrine, which is apostrophised by Senftleben as a precursor to the
three-step test. 5 The background for this was that while Members
could agree in principle about the right to public performance being
granted to authors, they were wary about this possibly hindering the
application of exceptions that were traditionally anchored in domestic
law."6 On the other hand, it also proved very difficult to promulgate
an express catalogue of limitations and exceptions that members were
entitled to keep or to introduce in their legislation. Instead, the possi-
bility to retain "minor reservations" came to be acknowledged as a gen-
erally accepted practice.8 7
However, the "way out" provided by the minor reservations
doctrine proved to be insufficient when the reproduction right was to
82 WIPO Study supra note 9, at 65, remarks that the adoption of the three-step for
limitations and exceptions under the TRIPS Agreement (and the subsequent copy-
right treaties) "has more been by accident than by design, in that it was immedi-
ately to hand as a ready-to-use formula at the time of the TRIPS negotiations, and,
once this had happened, it was almost inevitable that it would be taken up as the
general test in subsequent conventions."
83 Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 9.
84 For the history of Article 9.2, see RicKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 759
(noting that the most influential in this regard was a report prepared by the Swed-
ish BIRPI group of 1964 ("BIRPI" is the Bureaux Internationaux R6unis de la
Propri 6t Intellectuelle, a sort of predecessor to WIPO, founded in 1967)).
85 See SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7, at 45.
86 Id.
87 SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7, at 45-46. See also WIPO Study, supra note 9, at 34.
See generally RIcKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 830-36; SILKE VON LEWIN-
SKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAw AND POLICY §§ 5.200-202 (2008).
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be expressly incorporated into the Berne Convention. Reforming this
problem was one of the major aims of the Stockholm Revision Confer-
ence. The growing potential for mechanical copying of texts as well as
of sound recordings-early foreshadows of what finally developed into
the digital revolution-was already perceived as a serious threat to
copyright, and stemming the tide by implanting firm barriers in the
international protection framework appeared crucial. On the other
hand, it had also become obvious that members, to a varying degree,
considered it necessary or desirable to reserve options allowing for cop-
ying under specific circumstances or for privileged educational or in-
formational purposes."8 It was felt that at least some of those
exceptions might go beyond pure de minimis rules, as had been encom-
passed previously by the minor reservations doctrine. On the other
hand, efforts to compile a list expressly indicating the most frequently
used exceptions from the reproduction right, like, inter alia, private
copying, did not bear fruit in the end, as it was feared that if it was not
rigid enough to fulfil its purpose, it might lead to a serious erosion of
the exclusive position of the author.8 9 In the end, partly due to the
strong and active involvement of the German chairman of Committee
1, Eugen Ulmer, Members consented on a general-clause like proposal
which, after some re-drafting, was cast in the present form of Article
9.2.90
3. The three-step test as embedded in TRIPS
a) The wording of the provisions compared with each other
The wording of the provisions modelled on the three-step test
in the different sections of Part II TRIPS differs to a varying degree
from each other and from the "original."9 1
Article 13, which pertains to copyright, stipulates,
"Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclu-
sive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unrea-
88 In the report by the Swedish BIRPI study group, see supra note 84, the limita-
tions most frequently found in Member States' copyright laws with regard to re-
production had been compiled. The list is reproduced in RICKETSON & GINSBURG,
supra note 2, at 759 n.6.
89 RIcKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 761 (quoting Swedish BIRPI study
group, supra note 84, at 49 n.24).
90 Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 9.2.
91 Differences also exist with regard to the heading of each of these provisions:
Limitations and Exceptions (Article 13), Exceptions (Article 17), Protection (Article
26), Exceptions to Rights Conferred (Article 30).
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sonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder.9 2
Article 17, which pertains to trademarks, reads,
"Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights
conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive
terms, provided that such exceptions take account of the
legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of
third parties."3
Article 26.2, which pertains to industrial designs, declares,
Members may provide limited exceptions to the protection
of industrial designs, provided that such exceptions do
not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of
protected industrial designs and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the owner of the pro-
tected design, taking account of the legitimate interests of
third parties.94
And finally, Article 30, which pertains to patents, sets out that,
"Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such excep-
tions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal ex-
ploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, tak-
ing account of the legitimate interests of third parties."
Article 17 bears the smallest resemblance with Article 9.2 RBC as well
as with the other "variations" of the three-step test in TRIPS. This is
owed to the fact that notwithstanding their recognition as a full-
fledged IP right, the protection conferred to trademarks is neverthe-
less primarily determined by their function of indicating commercial
origin. With trademarks being a communication tool par excellence,
the right of third parties to use the sign in order to engage in basically
correct commercial communication must be respected, even though to
do so might cause some prejudice to the value possibly vested in the
mark.
No such particularities exist regarding the other IP rights.96
Nevertheless, different wording has been chosen for the provisions em-
92 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 13.
93 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 17.
94 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 26.
95 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 30.
96 Roughly speaking, from an economic point of view, the owner of a patent, indus-
trial design or copyright is assigned an exclusive market position as a basis for
recouping investments made in the invention or creation, thus preventing market
failure leading to underinvestment in innovation and creative activities. In the
20091
310 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 8:3
bedding the three-step test in copyright, industrial design and patent
law: whereas Article 13 echoes Article 9.2 by referring to "certain spe-
cial cases", and by omitting any mention of the "interest of third par-
ties", both Arts. 26.2 and 30 refer to "limited exceptions" with regard to
the first step, refer to an "unreasonable" conflict occurring in the sec-
ond step, and include third parties' interests in the third step.
As it was pointed out by the WTO Panel in the Canada - Pat-
ents report, the drafting history does not offer an explanation as to
why these differences occurred and whether they were intended to
have any specific meaning.9 7 As the wording of Article 13 was largely
pre-determined by Article 9.2 RBC with its background in the conti-
nental European copyright tradition permeating the Berne system, the
question would be whether the patent and industrial design provisions
were deliberately phrased so as to allow for a less rigid interpretation.
Although an argument could be made in favor of that reading, it has so
far not been taken up in the debates, and was also not endorsed (nor
expressly rejected) in the WTO report.
Finally, it shall be noted that a minuscule difference also exists
between Article 26.2 (industrial designs) and Article 30 (patents):
whereas the latter refers to conflicts with "a" normal exploitation of
the right, the design provision is concerned with "the" normal
exploitation.
b) The TRIPS provisions compared with Article 9.2 Berne
Convention
Article 13 of TRIPS bears the closest resemblance with Article
9.2 of the Berne Convention.9" Nevertheless, differences do exist that
have a conspicuous bearing on the breadth of the provision. First,
whereas Article 9.2 is formulated as an entitlement for Member States
("It shall be a matter for (national) legislation.. ."), Article 13 applies a
different perspective, in that it emphasizes the constraints for Mem-
bers' legislatures when permitting for exceptions or limitations ("Mem-
bers shall confine. . .."). More importantly, while Article 9.2 only
concerns the reproduction right, article 13 applies to all rights con-
ferred under copyright.9 9 Furthermore, Article 9.2, in line with the
case of copyright, continental European thinking also emphasizes the aspect of
protecting the author's personal rights.
97 The negotiating records show only that the term 'limited exceptions' was em-
ployed very early in the drafting process, well before the decision to adopt a text
modeled on Article 9.2, but do not indicate why it was retained in the later draft
texts modelled on Berne Article 9.2. See Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 9.2.
98 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 13; Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 9.2.
99 According to the European system, this does not include the so-called related
rights, i.e. the rights of performing artists, phonogram producers (and broadcast-
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objective and spirit underlying the Berne Convention, deals with pro-
tection of the interests of the author, i.e., according to traditional Euro-
pean thinking, the personal creator of a work. By contrast, Article 13
refers to the interests of the right holder, i.e. to all those who have
acquired a right, be it by creation or transfer.
Whereas the reformulation of Article 9.2 in the framework of
Article 13 appears explicable in light of the wider ambit Article 13 is
intended to cover, it is unclear whether the differences to be found in
the wording of Article 9.2 on the one hand and Articles 17, 26.2 and 30
on the other is indicative of a deliberate and substantial deviation
from the former in its capacity as serving as the historic basis for un-
derstanding the three-step test. Judging from the WTO Panel reports,
the general opinion rather seems to hold that while meriting attention,
the differences in the formulations should not be overestimated. On
the contrary, the tendency seems to prevail that by way of "horizontal
reading", the requirements set out in the different wordings are held to
inform each other, thereby reinforcing the restrictive tendencies inher-
ent in each of them.
4. The three-step test in the panel reports
a) General remarks
Until now, the three-step test has been addressed in three
panel reports. These concerned patents (Canada - Patents),'0 0 copy-
right (USA - Copyright),10 ' and trademark law in relation to protec-
tion of geographical indications (EU - GIs).' 2 Industrial design law
has not been involved in Dispute Settlement proceedings so far, but
ers). Article 14, the provision on related rights, does not contain its own three-step
test either. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 14. However, the gap has been filled by
article 16.2 of the Performaces and Phonograms Treaty. WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 [herein-
after WPPT] available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocswo034.
html. Note that article 10 imports the three-step test into the WCT - which is of
practical importance for the making available-right - and emphasizes that the
provision has to be applied with regard to all rights set out in the Berne Conven-
tion, i.e. not only the reproduction right. WCT, supra note 68, art. 10.
100 Panel Report, Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/
DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Patent Panel Report].
101 Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/
DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Copyright Panel Report].
102 Panel Report, European Communities - Protection of Trademarks and Geo-
graphical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R
(Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Trademark Panel Report].
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the issue has become topical in the European discussion concerning
the so-called repairs clause for spare parts. 10 3
The issues treated in the panel reports are only briefly summa-
rized here; having been the object of world-wide attention, it is sup-
posed they are familiar to most readers. Canada - Patents concerned
two exceptions in Canadian patent law that allowed medication to be
manufactured by competitors before the lapse of the patent covering
them. The first exception (called Bolar or regulatory exception) al-
lowed making the samples needed for market permission, and deliver-
ing them to a competent agency; according to the second (stockpiling
exception) it was permitted even to make larger quantities of still pro-
tected medicaments in order to keep them in store for the time when
the patent has lapsed. The first type of exception was found accept-
able by the panel, whereas the second was considered incompatible
with TRIPS Article 30. In USA - Copyright, the panel examined the
so-called homestyle and business exceptions set out in Sec. 110 (5) (A)
and (B) copyright act. The first of these permits amplifying broadcast
transmissions in commercial establishments provided that the equip-
ment used does not go beyond a certain ("homestyle") capacity.' 0 4 The
second makes the exception dependent on the size of the establishment
concerned. Again, the panel accepted the first and condemned the sec-
ond type of exception. Finally, in EU - GIs, the primary concern was
the compatibility of the requirements posed for protection of geograph-
ical indications relating to third countries under the EU GI protection
regime with TRIPS, in particular the national treatment principle. In
the same context, the question had also been posed whether the fact
that a prior trademark must coexist with a subsequently protected GI
103 Faced with the problem that if design rights are granted for parts of complex
products, the maker of the original product will automatically obtain a monopoly
on the repair market, the Commission has proposed to introduce a rule permitting
the manufacture and sale of parts for repair purposes, to the extent this is neces-
sary to restore the original appearance of the complex product. See Committee on
Legal Affairs, Working Document on the Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 98 1 71 /EC on the Legal Protec-
tion of Designs COM (2004) 582 final (Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dt/562/562518/562518en.pdf.
This proposal was criticized for violating TRIPS Article 26(2). See Joseph Straus,
Design Protection for Spare Parts Gone in Europe? Proposed Changes to the EC
Directive: The Commission's Mandate and its Doubtful Execution, 27 EUR. IN-
TELL. PROP. REV. 391, 397 (2005). But see Annette Kur, Limiting IP Protection
for Competition Policy Reasons, in HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
COMPETITION LAW 313, 336 (2008) (refuting Straus' argument that the proposal
violated TRIPS).
104 Strangely enough, the panel seems to have (mis)understood the "homestyle"
provisions so as to only apply to broadcasting of "big" musical works such as op-
eras, musicals etc. See infra V.4.b(i).
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instead of being entitled to claim an exclusive right was violating Arti-
cle 16 TRIPS. With regard to the latter question, the panel found that
in this specific case, and under the precautions set out in the EU GI
Regulation, coexistence constituted an acceptable solution in the light
of Article 17 and the special kind of three-step test it embraces.
The panel reports are extremely lengthy, and even in edited
form,'0 5 they make for tough reading. As it is plain to see for everyone
who has grappled with them, the impressive volume of the reports is
not at all indicative of the richness of the legal argumentation con-
tained therein. On the contrary - it is amazing how little substance
can be filtered out of so many words and how repetitive the reasoning
tends to be. It must be duly noted in this context that the panellists-
who are not themselves writing the report anyway-cannot be blamed
for the redundancy of the text. With Dispute Settlement proceedings
being a matter of high political sensitivity, it must be made sure that
every statement made in the process by any Member be duly noted
and commented upon, whether or not it makes a meaningful contribu-
tion to the issue as such.
For a better understanding of the argumentation employed in
the three reports, it is helpful to embark on a comparative analysis, as
was provided inter alia by Senftleben °6 and by Dreier. ° 7 The most
interesting insights result from a comparison between the patent and
the copyright panel report, which show clear signs of close relationship
and mutual influence. Accordingly, those reports will be in the centre
of the following considerations. By contrast, the comparability of the
trademark panel's reasoning is somewhat reduced, due to the way in
which the specific character of trademark law has influenced the word-
ing of Article 17. The trademark report will therefore only be ad-
dressed where there is also common interest with regard to the other
legal areas.
105 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw & POLICY, 364, 462,
570, 800 ( G. Dinwoodie, W. Hennessey, S. Perlmutter & G. Austin eds., 3d ed.
2008) (addressing the EU - Gis, Canada - Patents, and U.S. - Copyright cases in
turn).
106 See generally Martin Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting
Intellectual Property Rights? - WTO Panel Reports Shed Light on the Three-Step
Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark Law, 37 INT'L
R. INTELL. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 407 (2006).
107 See generally Thomas Dreier, Interpreting International IP Law-Some Obser-
vations Regarding WTO Dispute Resolution, in FESTSCHRIFr FUR KOLLE UND
STAUDER [WRITINGS IN HONOUR OF KOLLE AND STAUDER] 45-62 (Annette Kur, et al.
eds, 2005).
20091
314 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 8:3
b) The main lines of argument in the panel reports
(i) General structure and first step
As a general starting point, all three panels emphasize that the
test actually does consist of three (in trademark law: two) clearly dis-
cernible stages, which must be passed through cumulatively and in a
strict order, with the criteria applied on each stage being specific in
their meaning and separate from each other, to avoid redundancy.10 8
All panels relate to the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (VCLT)
as the basis for their interpretation. °9
With regard to the first step, all three reports emphasize that
in order to comply with it, the limitation at stake must be "narrow".
For the patent panel, this resolves from the double qualification of a
"limited exception" - as an exception is already something that is nec-
essarily narrower than the right, the additional reference to "limited"
must mean that it can only be referencing a "small diminution" of the
right." ° The same interpretation was embraced by the trademark
panel. The copyright panel marked in its interpretation that the term"certain" related to legal certainty, whereas "special" was supposed to
mean narrow in a qualitative as well as a quantitative sense, i.e. that
it must have "a narrow scope as well as an exceptional or distinctive
objective."
For copyright law, the panel's interpretation of the word "cer-
tain" has triggered an animated debate about the compatibility of the
fair use clause in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act with the three-
step test. Although doubts in that regard have been ventured, the ma-
jority opinion seems to hold that "fair use" after all does grant the nec-
108 See, e.g., Copyright Panel Report, supra note 101, 6.97 ("The three conditions
apply on a cumulative basis, each being a separate and independent requirement
that must be satisfied."); Patent Panel Report, supra note 100, 7.21 ("each of the
three (steps) must be presumed to mean something different from the other two, or
else there would be redundancy.. .an exception that complies with the first condi-
tion can nevertheless violate the second or third, and that one which complies with
the first and second can still violate the third.").
109 VCLT, supra note 44, art. 31, 32. Not all WTO members have adhered to the
VCLT. However, its application appears justified according to Article 3(2) of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
the provisions (inter alia) of TRIPS are to be clarified "in accordance with custom-
ary rules of interpretation of public international law", Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instru-
ments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU];
WIPO Study, supra note 9, at 5; see also Comment, Neil Netanel, 37 VA. J. INT'L L.
441, 449 (1997).
110 Contrary to that, Canada had argued that "limited" was intended to mean"confined within definite limits" Patent Panel Report, supra note 100, 4.14.
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essary degree of legal security. The main arguments were already
briefly reviewed above.1 1 1 In addition to that, it has been pointed out
that the signatories of TRIPS (and already those of the Berne Conven-
tion, when Article 9.2 was inserted) were aware of the legal approach
taken in U.S. copyright, and deliberately aimed to draft a compromise
between systems employing flexible clauses and those operating on the
basis of closed catalogues. According to that argumentation, it would
be a grave mistake if the compromised character of the three-step test
were contorted by way of a rigid and formalistic interpretation. 1 12
For the case before the copyright panel, the certainty require-
ment was not an issue anyhow, as it concerned a statutory provision
that was precise enough. Both the copyright panel and the patent
panel therefore concentrated on the issue whether the limitations were
sufficiently narrow.1 1 3 As a result of their examination, both panels
dismissed one of the exceptions as failing the conditions in the first
step, while accepting the other. With regard to the Canadian stockpil-
ing exemption, which failed the first step in patent law, the panel
placed emphasis on the fact that during the last six months of patent
protection, no quantitative restrictions existed as to the production of
medicaments for stockpiling purposes, meaning that protection
against the "making" and "using" of drugs embodying the patent were
entirely removed." 4 The copyright panel based its evaluation mainly
on a survey undertaken in 1995 which showed that rather high per-
centages-65.2 of all eating and 71.8 per cent of all drinking establish-
ments-were potential beneficiaries of the business exemption, while
the respective figures for the homestyle exception were supposed to be
much lower." 5 The latter conclusion was reached on the basis of an
interpretation by the panel, on which the parties concurred, that the
homestyle exception in Section 110(5)(A) only applies to music that is
part of an opera, operetta, or other similar dramatic work when per-
formed in a dramatic content. 11 6 Had it not been for that understand-
ing, the provision would hardly have "survived" the test." 7
111 See supra Part III. 2.
112 See SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7, at 135.
113 See, e.g., Copyright Panel Report, supra note 101, 6.104, 6.136, 6.144; Pat-
ent Panel Report, supra note 100, 4.14, 4.30, 7.28, 7.45.
114 Patent Panel Report, supra note 100, 7.34.
115 Copyright Panel Report, supra note 101, 6.118.
116 It seems that the interpretation suggested here is indeed what most Ameri-
cans have assumed Sec. 110 (5) subparagraph (A) to mean before the panel report.
See Copyright Panel Report, supra note 101, 6.98.
117 This conclusion was reached by using an e-contrario argument (based on the
words "other than in subparagraph B," 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2008)), placing subpar-
agraph (A) in juxtaposition to subparagraph (B), which applies to the display of
non-dramatic musical works. Although that understanding was not seriously chal-
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As is remarked inter alia by Senftleben, all three panels decid-
edly avoided to embark on a discussion of normative elements, i.e. the
motives on which the limitations are founded and their justification in
the light of the objectives underlying the IP right concerned, and the
objectives and principles of TRIPS."' This abstinence is not necessa-
rily induced by the wording of the relevant provisions. For example,
the reference to "special cases" in Article 13, which, as the panel itself
observes, addresses the "distinctive objective", could very well furnish
an inroad into consideration of normative aspects already at this
stage. The reason for refraining from such an examination therefore
seems to have been the attempt to keep the steps separate from each
other, and to preserve the evaluation of policy aspects to a later stage.
This point is strongly emphasized by Jane Ginsburg," 9 who is sup-
ported in that regard by Sam Ricketson. 12 °
While the argument appears convincing from a systematic
point of view, it becomes highly questionable if an exception is already"sorted out" on the first step, and therefore never reaches a stage
where policy considerations are included in the assessment.' 2 ' This is
indeed what happened regarding the stockpiling exception in Canada
- Patents. Moreover, even if the provision under examination is sub-
mitted to all three steps-like the business exception in USA - Copy-
right-this does not help if the principle is endorsed (as both panels
did) that failure to meet any one of the three steps will necessarily
result in failure to pass the test in its entirety. For such an approach
to work properly, it must be possible to identify an absolute quantita-
lenged by the parties, it is highly doubtful whether this is indeed the meaning the
legislature intended to express in subparagraph (a). The legal history of the provi-
sion, whose origin is traced back to Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151 (1975), rather suggests that no such restriction had been intended. The
difference between the two subparagraphs indicated by the phrase "other than..."
can be explained quite naturally by the fact that the type of business mentioned in
subparagraph B was supposed to be covered by the exemption irrespective of the
type of equipment used; there is no cogent reason why it should also embrace the
kind of music to be exempted.
11s See SENFrLEBEN, supra note 7, at 135.
119 See generally Jane Ginsburg, Towards Supranational Copyright law? The
WTO Panel; Decision and the Three Step Test for Copyright Exceptions, REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR, (Jan. 2001) available in http://ssrn.con
abstract=253867.
121 See generally WIPO Study, supra note 9, at 22; see also RICKETSON & GINS-
BURG, supra note 2, at 766 (where the opposite view previously endorsed by Ricket-
son is expressly given up).
121 Jane Ginsburg's argument that the exception will fail to be tested by the sec-
ond and third steps in any event therefore is not necessarily correct, as the Patent
Panel Report has shown. The same thoughts as here are also expressed in the
Hugenholtz & Okediji, supra note 17, at 21.
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tive limit beyond which exceptions and limitations will necessarily vio-
late international law, without any regard had to the validity and
urgency of their motivation. It is strongly doubted here that such an
absolute limit does indeed exist. If at all, it would have to be defined
with much caution, in order not to prematurely discard exceptions that
may appear broad, but that are nevertheless founded on very sound
and valuable grounds. Better than that, it ought to be acknowledged
that in view of the task that the three-step has to fulfil, it is definitely
inappropriate that a purely quantitative assessment should become
the sole parameter for deciding on the admissibility of an exception.
Rather than determining whether a rule is "limited" (or "special") in
an absolute sense, it should be inquired how it is limited, i.e. what its
limitations are. The decisive question to be asked in the light of fur-
ther elements to be investigated on the following steps would then be
whether the exception is limited enough in view of its purpose and po-
tential impact.
Drawing attention to this point appears noteworthy not least
in view of the fact that in all three panel reports, the result reached on
the basis of the assessment undertaken on the first step already antici-
pated the final conclusion of the report as a whole.' 22 At least in those
cases, the first step seems to have been the essential test. It is uncer-
tain whether this is a typical structure. If it were so, it might be taken
as an indication that in spite of the emphasis placed on the cumulative
character of the individual steps and their mutual independence, there
is not much substance added on steps two or three - the dice may have
been thrown before one gets there. If that is true, it is all the more
important to ensure that policy considerations are not excluded from
the deliberation.
(ii) The second step
The central task for the second step is to determine what ac-
counts for a (conflict with the) "normal exploitation" of an IP right.' 23
While the term seems to suggest a clear, matter-of-fact type of analy-
sis, it turns out to be most problematic at closer scrutiny. It seems
clear, first, that the legal situation in a country where the rule under
examination currently applies cannot form the yardstick for what is
considered as normal, lest the test should lead into circular reason-
122 See generally Patent Panel Report, supra note 100; Copyright Panel Report,
supra note 101; Trademark Panel Report, supra note 102.
123 See, e.g., Patent Panel Report, supra note 100, 7.51-7.59; Copyright Panel
Report, supra note 101, 6.163-6.211; Trademark Panel Report, supra note 102,
7.649-7.650.
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ing.'2 4 Instead, "normal exploitation" is a fictitious scenario, with no
secure basis in actual law.' 2 5 The WTO panels chose as their starting
point the situation when full exclusivity is granted, minus insignifi-
cant detractions. For the patent panel, the normal practice of exploita-
tion is to "exclude all forms of competition that could detract
significantly from the economic returns anticipated from a patent's
grant of market exclusivity."' 2 6 The discussion became relevant in
view of the argument made by Canada that it was not "normal" in that
sense when patent holders enjoyed an additional period of de facto
market exclusivity after the lapse of pharmaceutical patents. 2 7 How-
ever, the panel declared itself "unable to accept that as a categorical
proposition."12  While market exclusivity resulting from the enforce-
ment of the sole right to production during the entire patent term was
considered to be "normal", a different position was taken with regard
to the making of samples for regulatory authorization. There, the
panel argued, the additional period of market exclusivity is not a nor-
mal or natural consequence of enforcing patent rights, but "an unin-
tended consequence of the conjunction of the patent laws with product
regulatory laws."' 2 9
It would have been interesting to see how the panel, after hav-
ing concluded its analysis as to what is regarded as normal exploita-
tion, might have interpreted the second element in Article 30, i.e. that
the conflict with a normal exploitation should not be "unreasonable."
At least as a matter of principle, this appears to leave room for the
possibility that in spite of conflicting with a normal exploitation, a lim-
itation still does make sense for general policy reasons - e.g. because it
improves the supply of the population with useful medication. As it
were, however, the panel did not find reason to embark on such an
exercise - in case of the regulatory exemption there was no conflict
124 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 769 (citing PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTER-
NATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE §5.5 (2001)).
125 As a matter of principle, a comparison of the legal situation abroad might give
some indication as to what is grosso modo regarded as "normal" in other countries.
However, that kind of reasoning - which the patent panel employed in the frame-
work of the third step - might also be dangerous, as it leads to a de facto canonisa-
tion of foreign practice leading to a "freeze-plus" dynamism, without those
standards having been prescribed by an international instrument. See infra V.4.e.
On the risks involved with a comparative approach in the three-step test see also
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual
Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 431, 439
(2004).
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with a normal exploitation to start with, and the stockpiling exemp-
tion (though indirectly addressed in the assessment of the "normalcy"
of an additional exclusivity period resulting from enforcement of the
production right) had been sorted out already on the first step.
In the copyright context, the issue of what may be a "reasona-
ble" conflict with normal exploitation is moot anyhow, because Article
13 does not mention that criterion at all on the second step. The evalu-
ation therefore turns exclusively on the definition of a normal exploita-
tion.1 3 0 As the copyright panel points out, "normal" in its ordinary
meaning has two connotations, one being of an empirical and the other
of a "somewhat more normative, if not dynamic" character. While the
empirical approach basically consists in an evaluation of the current
practice (in the relevant member state and abroad), the normative ele-
ment shall ensure that limitations are not regarded as non-interfering
with a normal exploitation simply for the reason that they concern an
option for revenues which for factual reasons until now is not, or is
only scarcely, used. In that regard, the panel's concerns echo similar
considerations as those which were already articulated in connection
with the introduction of the three-step test in Article 9.2 of the Berne
Convention at the Stockholm Revision Conference.' 3 '
Another issue of major importance in the copyright context
concerns the question whether in order to measure the normal ex-
ploitation of "a work" one needs to take into account the options for
deriving revenue from the bulk of rights attached to a work in its en-
tirety, or whether each exclusive right conferred by copyright must be
evaluated as such, without any difference between rights of major or
minor importance in view of the exploitation possibilities in their en-
tirety. The panel clearly opted for the second approach.13 2 In the pan-
elists' view, all exclusive rights must be considered separately, so as
not to undermine any one of them on the basis that sufficient revenue
may be flowing from exploitation of the remaining rights.13
The combined approach chosen by the copyright panel-first,
allocating all possible sources for revenue to the right holder, whether
presently used or not; second, subjecting each and every exclusive posi-
tion to a separate analysis, whether substantially contributing to the
130 See, e.g., Copyright Panel Report, supra note 101, IT 6.163-6.211.
131 SENFrLEBEN, supra note 7, at 43.
132 Copyright Panel Report, supra note 101, 6.173-6.174. This is criticized in
particular by SENFrLEBEN, supra note 7, at 189, 191 (arguing inter alia that the
approach "tends to shelter small exclusive rights more effectively from erosion
than smaller ones").
133 Copyright Panel Report, supra note 101, 6.173. As an additional motivation
for their approach, the panel pointed to the fact that the individual rights con-
ferred to the copyright owner need not necessarily be in the possession of the same
person. Id.
20091
320 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 8:3
entire arsenal of rights or not-leans very strongly to the side of pro-
prietary interests.13 1 On the basis of that analysis, it may be question-
able whether there is any possibility left for a limitation not to be
conflicting with a "normal exploitation". 135
In anticipation of such misgivings, the copyright panel pointed out
that,
not every use of a work, which in principle is covered by
the scope of exclusive rights and involves commercial
gain, necessarily conflicts with a normal exploitation of
that work. If this were the case, hardly any exception or
limitation would pass the test of the second condition and
Article 13 might be left devoid of meaning, because nor-
mal exploitation would be equated with full use of exclu-
sive rights. 13 6
Therefore, they propose to limit the decisive test on the second step to
situations when the use covered by the limitation "enters into eco-
nomic competition with the ways in which right holders normally ex-
tract economic value from (the specific right at stake) and thereby
deprive them of significant or tangible commercial gains."'13 Although
confirming thereby that not every limitation will be outlawed per se,
the concession thus made is rather poor in substance: it boils down to a
hypothetical analysis of the economic loss sustained by the limitation
as compared to a full exploitation of the right, i.e. to a test purely rely-
ing on financial arithmetic. 13  Accordingly, no room is left in the as-
sessment undertaken in the second step for consideration of policy
aspects.
Without criticizing the copyright panel for its reasoning, Rick-
etson, in his analysis of the second step in Article 9.2 of the Berne
134 This has been criticized repeatedly in various literature, see e.g. Severine
Dusollier, L'encadrement des exceptions au droit d'auteur par le test des trois
dtapes [The framework of the exceptions to copyright by the three-step test],
I.R.D.I. 217, 220 (2005); see also SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7, at 181 (particular in
regards to the new possibilities of restricting use and thereby engendering new
markets in the digital environment); Thomas Heide, The Berne Three-Step Test
and the Proposed Copyright Directive, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 105, 106.13' Due to the fact that unlike in the patent and industrial design tests, Article 13
does not require that the manner in which the use conflicts with a normal ex-
ploitation is "unreasonable" - according to the black letter, the finding of a conflict
is sufficient to fall foul of the second step.
136 Copyright Panel Report, supra note 101, 6.182 (emphasis added).
137 Id. 6.182.
138 One explanation for this may be found in the fact that the copyright panel
obviously felt bound by the minor reservations doctrine applying in the framework
of Article llbis of the Berne Convention. See Berne Convention, supra note 5, art.
llbis.
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Convention points out that it seems "logical to conclude that the scope
of the inquiry undertaken required on the second step... does include
consideration of non-economic considerations, i.e. whether this partic-
ular kind of use is one that the copyright owner should control."' 3 9 In
other words, even though the three-step test in copyright does not
make reference to a "reasonable" conflict with normal exploitation and
therefore does not contain an explicit invitation to include policy con-
siderations, it is nevertheless strongly advisable to embark on such an
effort. 140 For patent law, of course; this should be mandatory anyhow
- the total absence of any such discussion in the panel report due to
the stockpiling exception's dismissal already on the first step marks a
serious loophole in the patent panel's reasoning.
Apart from that, one might ask why an inquiry for normalcy
must necessarily take its starting point in the scenario of a right
holder fully exploiting what actual or potential markets may yield. 141
For a comprehensive picture, it would be equally important to explore
what would constitute the minimum level of market exclusivity neces-
sary to prevent market failure. Anything lying between those two ex-
tremes might arguably be considered as a kind of "normal
exploitation". From this perspective, "normalcy" becomes a relative
notion stretching over a range of differentiated options. Instead of pin-
pointing one specific result, it establishes the general framework for a
gradual measurement to be undertaken in light of the strength and
urgency of the legal motives underlying the rule at stake.
139 WIPO Study, supra note 9, at 25; see also RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note
2, at 771.
140 The normative interests possibly justifying a conflict with "normal interpreta-
tion" are further qualified by WIPO Study, supra note 9, at 26; RICKETSON & GINS-
BURG, supra note 2, at 773 (They would need "a clear public interest that goes
beyond the purely individual interest of copyright users", meaning that they"should be of analogous significance to those already accepted as appropriate
under other provisions of the Berne Convention, such as article 10 and 10b.")
From the approach chosen here, such qualifications are unnecessary at this stage:
Under the proportionality test to be evaluated at the end of this piece, see infra
Parts V.6.a & V.6.b, it follows as a matter of course that "purely individual" inter-
ests of users will only be able to justify rather small encroachments.
141 Several proposals have been made in the literature for applying a different
yardstick than full exploitation (minus insignificant reductions). SENFTLEBEN,
supra note 7, at 194 (suggesting that a conflict with normal exploitation (only)
arises "when authors are divested of an actual or potential, typical major source of
revenue that carries weight within the overall commercialisation of works of the
relevant category"); Dusollier argues that normal exploitation "only covers the
main avenues of the exploitation of the work, those that provide the author with
his main sources of revenue." Dusollier, supra note 134, at 222.
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(iii) The third step
If not before, several opportunities for a discussion of policy is-
sues are offered on the third step.' 4 2 First, in all the areas concerned,
it must be considered whether the prejudice eventually caused by the
limitation is "unreasonable;" second, the interests associated with it
must be considered as "legitimate," and third, in patent, design and
trademark law, the interests of "third parties" must be taken into
account.
Of these potential inroads for policy considerations, the atten-
tion of the patent panel was practically exclusively focused on the "le-
gitimacy" of the proprietors' interests. It posed the question, first,
whether "legitimate" interests were to be understood in the same way
as "legal" interests, i.e. all aspects of the right conferred in principle by
the legal title of a patent, and, if not, how the two notions were to be
distinguished from each other. 143 Concerning the distinction between
"legitimate" and "legal," the panel emphasized that the former notion
must be defined in the way it is often used in legal discourse - as a
normative claim "calling for the protection of interests that are justifi-
able" in the sense that they are supported by the relevant policies or
social norms.14 4 The following example is offered as an illustration:
The objective of patent law is to facilitate the dissemination and ad-
vancement of technical knowledge. Those goals are also furthered by
scientific experimentation. Therefore, a rule allowing for experimental
use would not be encroaching upon the legitimate interests of the pat-
ent holder - on the contrary, the panel concludes that both the scien-
tist and society have a "legitimate interest" in keeping such uses free
from the exclusive right.14 5
Having followed the panel's reasoning so far, one is interested
to learn more about how that type of reasoning is applied to the regu-
latory exception which is at stake here. One possible line of argumen-
tation might be that another objective for patent law, in particular in
the area of pharmaceuticals, is to promote the invention of new drugs
in order to optimize the public supply with useful medications. To en-
142 For that reason, Geiger has proposed to "reverse" the three-step test, see Chris-
tophe Geiger, The Three-Step Test, a Threat to Balanced Copyright? 37 INT'L R.
INTELL. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 283 (2006); see, e.g., Geiger, supra note 81; SENF-
TLEBEN, supra note 7, at 193 (pointing out that "the final decision on compliance
can confidently be left to the three-step test," which, not least because of the "pos-
sibility of factoring the payment of equitable remuneration into the equation.. .is
better equipped for striking a better balance").
143 Patent Panel Report, supra note 100, 7.68.
144 Id. 7.69.
145 The panel thereby seems to suggest a kind of de facto obligation of Members to
introduce a research exception.
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able others to add to the available stock of market supply, at the earli-
est point in time after the absolute right has ceased, might, in light of
that objective, also appear as a legitimate interest of (in this case) com-
petitors and society. However, whether the panel at least in internal
debate has used that sort of reasoning (which it had suggested itself by
its example drawn from the research exception) remains unknown - if
it did, it has at least not left visible traces in the report. Instead, the
panel turns to the possible economic losses incurred by the patent
holder due to the regulatory exemption, whose effects are not miti-
gated under Canadian law by complementary measures like, in the
EU, the possibility to apply for a certificate extending the time of pro-
tection.' 4 6 The case is finally closed after a comparative test - the
panel is satisfied by the observation that while other countries do ap-
ply a regulatory exemption, not all of them provide for extensions of
the kind available in the EU. This, they conclude, shows that interests
of patent holders in abolishing the exception are not "legitimate" in the
meaning of Article 30.147 No other arguments are tested and none of
the other elements of which the third step consists are addressed.
One might have rather expected the panel to say that although
the interest of right-holders in a de facto-prolongation of the protection
period may be legitimate as such, the Canadian government neverthe-
less did not act unreasonably when granting the Bolar-type of excep-
tion. As it is now, the argument is invited on the basis of the panel
report that governments are (at least in a 'moral' sense) obliged to in-
troduce such limitations, lest patent holders should derive "illegiti-
mate" profits from the fact that generic manufacturers must wait until
the expiry of the patent before initiating regulatory process.
Contrary to that, the copyright panel's analysis was concen-
trated on the "unreasonableness" of the prejudice caused, as the legiti-
macy of interests had not been questioned by the parties. 4 ' First, the
panel noted,
that the ordinary meaning of 'prejudice' connotes dam-
age, harm, or injury. 'Not unreasonable' connotes a
slightly stricter threshold than 'reasonable.' The latter
term means 'proportionate', within the limits of reason,
not greatly less or more than might be thought likely or
146 Patent Panel Report, supra note 100, 7.31.
147 Id. 7.49.
148 As a matter of principle, the copyright panel followed the patent panel in its
definition of what was to be considered as legitimate interests. It held that in
addition to "lawfulness from a legal positivist perspective," Copyright Panel Re-
port, supra note 101, 6.224, the term also includes a more normative perspective,"calling for the protection of interests that are justifiable in the light of the objec-
tives that underlie the protection of exclusive rights." Id.
20091
324 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 8:3
appropriate' or 'of a fair, average or considerable amount
or size. 14
9
With regard to the conflict at stake, the panel concludes that "legiti-
mate interest" means the economic value of the exclusive rights con-
ferred by copyright on the holders.' 5 ° Taking into consideration that
under the third step, "a certain amount of 'prejudice' has to be pre-
sumed justified as 'not unreasonable'," they contend that in their view"prejudice to the legitimate interests of right holders reaches an un-
reasonable level if an exception or limitation causes or has the poten-
tial to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner."' 5 '
This brings them back to the same kind of financial arithmetic they
have already employed in the first and second step, and it leads to the
same result as before: the prejudice caused by the business exception
is unreasonable, whereas that caused by the homestyle exemption re-
mains to be within acceptable limits. It is not discussed in that context
that the homestyle exception obviously creates a particular prejudice
for a specific type of music and for those who create and perform it,
inviting the question whether and which legislative motives may pos-
sibly account for that. Rather than embarking on such ground, the
copyright panel, just like the patent panel, does not address policy is-
sues at all.' 52
Some insights for interpretation of the third step are offered by
the trademark panel, which in the first two steps shows little to com-
pare with copyright and patent law, due to the different structure of
Article 17 of TRIPS. For the definition of "legitimate interests", the
trademark panel adopted literally the explanation given by the patent
panel.' 5 3 For an identification of the relevant interests in that sense,
the panel placed particular emphasis on the function of trademarks to
distinguish goods and services according to their commercial origin. It
149 Id. 6.225. With all due respect, the finding regarding the difference between
"not unreasonable" and "reasonable" seems to contradict the "ordinary meaning"
test to be applied pursuant to Article 31 VCLT; "Not unreasonable" appears as the
broader notion, comprising everything (just) above the threshold of what would
have to considered as "unreasonable".
150 Copyright Panel Report, supra note 101, 6.271.
151 Id. 6.229.
152 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 95, 95-122 (2004)
(Providing an additional policy argument pointing out that the U.S. homestyle and
business exceptions were part of the larger "package deal" introducing longer pro-
tection periods and thereby, in its entirety, strengthening the position of copyright
holders.)
113 Patent Panel Report, supra note 100, 7.663 ("normative claim calling for pro-
tection of interests that are 'justifiable' in the sense that they are supported by
social policies or other social norms").
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concluded that the basic legitimate interest of every trademark owner
lies "in preserving the distinctiveness, or capacity to distinguish, of its
trademark so that it can perform that function."154 That way, account
would also be taken of the trademark holders interest "in the economic
value of its mark arising from the reputation it enjoys and the quality
it denotes."' 5 5 Furthermore, regarding the interests of third parties,
the Panel referred to the interest of consumers "in being able to distin-
guish goods and services of one undertaking from those of another, and
to avoid confusion."' 56 Hence, no diversity was found in that regard
between trademark owners' and consumers' interests. Finally, the
users of a geographical indication under the EU-GI system were said
to be figuring as "third parties" whose interests must be taken into
account in the framework of the balancing exercise.'1 7 In the case at
hand, the coexistence between trademarks and subsequent geographi-
cal indications, which had been challenged as being incompatible with
TRIPS, was found to be acceptable, in view of the fact that the rules
were designed so as to reduce the risk for conflicts to a strict mini-
mum, with the pertinent consequence that the actual number of con-
flicts was indeed extremely small.
The trademark report is interesting because it expanded, as
the first and only report so far, on the meaning of "third parties",
whose interests must be taken into account for the assessment of the
third step (except for copyright). As was set out above, the panel as-
sumed that the notion included the interests of the users of protected
geographical designations. This has been criticized by Senftleben as
construing the term too broadly.' On the basis of the contention that
"(t)hese persons are the very beneficiaries of the EC coexistence re-
gime imposing certain limitations on prior trademark rights and ac-
cordingly, appear as the counterpart of trademark owners rather than
third parties," he concludes that the reference to third parties in Arti-
cle 17 TRIPS, "apparently, refers to the concerns of those persons who
could be affected detrimentally by the limitation in question, such
as... consumers."15 9 However, the attitude of the Panel appears to
comply with general legal parlance. "Third parties" usually connotes
all those who, but for the existence of exceptions or limitations, would
154 Trademark Panel Report, supra note 102, 7.644; SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7,
at 431.
155 Trademark Panel Report, supra note 102, 7.644.
156 Id. 7.676.
157 Id. 7.681.
158 Martin Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual
Property Rights? - WTO Panel Reports Shed Light on the Three-Step Test in Copy-
right Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark Law, 37 INT'L REV. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 407, 433 (2006).
159 Id.
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be excluded from making use of the subject matter protected by the
right, in other words, those who are neither holders of the IP right nor
stand in contractual relations with them. The same view was brought
forward by Canada in the patents case, stating that "third parties" is a
reference to those who are adverse in interest to the patent holder. 160
It is obvious that these persons will in many cases be exactly the same
as those who directly benefit from the limitation.
c) Summarizing the panels' approach
Having studied the panel reports to some extent, one is
tempted to say that the most remarkable thing about them is what one
does not find there. In particular, with some exception to be made for
the trademark report, nowhere do the panels venture into a discussion
of the policies underlying the limitations at stake. This is especially
noteworthy in the patent report - quite obviously, the Canadian legis-
lature did have a distinct objective for inserting the regulatory as well
as the stockpiling exception. However, even though the panel itself
seems to invite a discussion of policies and objectives on the third step,
it prefers not to embark such on a debate with regard to the regulatory
exception, let alone the stockpiling exception, which, after having been
judged as failing the first step, is never taken up for consideration
again. But also in the copyright case, where both exceptions are sub-
mitted to testing on all three steps, the evaluation is remarkably silent
on points of policy. One may wonder why, as the argument had in fact
been advanced by the United States that the insertion of Section 110
(5)(A) and (B) was founded on considerations which, although not re-
lated to "cultural" values, at least were arguably sound. 16 1 However,
it seems that the panel rather leaned towards the opinion that the eco-
nomic reasons accounting for the exceptions were not really "presenta-
ble" in the framework of the three-step test. 16 2
Whatever the reasons were for the relative paucity of the rea-
soning, the fact remains that the many pages of written text can be
160 Patent Panel Report, supra note 100, 4.14.
161 See First Written Submission of the United States, United States - Section
110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 1, 73, WT/DS160 (Oct. 26, 1999).
162 See WIPO Study, supra note 9, at 24-25 (noting that with regard to the provi-
sion at stake, "there was no real need to consider [underlying policy aspects], as
the 'pork and barrel' exception in issue had none of the significant justifications
that often underlie copyright exceptions, such as free speech, scholarship, educa-
tion and so on."). However, this position fails to take account of the fact that in the
end, also the interests of right holders to receive full revenues for whatever use is
made of the protected subject matter is of an essentially economic ("pork and bar-
rel") character. Furthermore, the picture also changes when considering the
larger legislative framework of which the homestyle exception formed part.
Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 152, at 122.
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summarized quite briefly. First, what counts in the first and foremost
place is how much the limitation detracts from a full right, both with
regard to the individual elements of the rights conferred, and in terms
of the potential revenues to be gained from full exploitation. These
aspects, in particular the latter, are considered, embedded in varying
wording but unchanged in their essence, on each and every one of the
three steps. In spite of the rhetorical emphasis placed by the panels on
the need for an interpretation that avoids redundancy, their argumen-
tation covers exactly the same aspect several times over. The only addi-
tional clue, taken into account by the patent panel, was derived from a
comparison with the legal situation abroad. This warrants the conclu-
sion that exemptions of more than purely de minimis character stand
a certain chance of being accepted only where it can be demonstrated
that a similar rule also applies in a notable number of other countries.
Contrary to that, new types of exemptions have the odds against them.
This somewhat simplified, but basically realistic record of the
panels' interpretation of the three-step test raises a number of ques-
tions. Most conspicuously, the combination of the cautious approach
taken by the panels on all three steps and the complementary compar-
ison with foreign legislations resolves in the implementation of freeze-
plus dynamics on the international level.163 Either the general situa-
tion remains the same, or it evolves in the direction of expanded guar-
antees for right holders to secure full exploitation of their rights.164
Movements in the other direction, in other words, the introduction or
substantial reinforcement of limitations intended to improve access to
protected subject matter, are faced with severe impediments or are
even straightforwardly outlawed.
On the one hand, it might be said that this is nothing but the
typical effect of international conventions based on minimum stan-
dards. On the other hand, this is an area where the exact meaning of
the international norm has not been stamped out expressly, thus leav-
ing a certain amount of discretion that must work both ways. To effec-
tively hold that the standards presently employed by a sizeable
number of WTO member states form a threshold which can only be
deviated from in the direction of stronger protection fits badly with the
aim to strike the optimal balance between diverging interests in a
world of rapidly changing socio-economic conditions.
163 For a critical view on the results possibly yielded by comparative analysis, see
SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7, at 174.
164 Id.
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5. A fresh approach to the three-step test: Opting for flexibility
a) Legal effect of the panel reports
The analysis undertaken above has revealed several points of
doubt concerning the WTO panels' approach towards the three-step
test. It is therefore important to explore whether the legal effect of the
panel decisions is such that it would indeed have a certain authorita-
tive force.
Panel reports that are adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body
become binding upon the parties of the dispute, who will then either
have to comply with the result or be entitled to impose trade sanctions
on the losing party, as the case may be.1 65 Whether there is any legal
effect beyond that appears to be doubtful.166 Part of this is attributa-
ble to the fact that the character of the proceedings is also not quite
clear. Whereas some features of the dispute settlement, by means of
establishing a panel, are pointing in the direction of judicial proceed-
ings, the fact that it only operates within the closed system of the WTO
rather marks its resemblance with a specific type of arbitration sys-
tem.16 7 Irrespective of that question, it seems that it has never been
argued that the stare decisis doctrine applies to the outcome of panel
reports, in other words, a subsequent panel applying the test would in
principle be free to develop its own way of reasoning.1 68
On a different level, however, it might be asked whether an
adopted report becomes binding in so far as it constitutes a "subse-
quent agreement" or a "subsequent practice" in the meaning of VCLT
Article 31.3(a) and (b) respectively. 169 As a possible argument sup-
porting the finding of a "subsequent agreement," one might refer to the
fact that the Dispute Settlement Body needs to be discharged by the
General Council, meaning that ultimately the decisions taken become
accepted by all members. 170 However, such a wide interpretation
would hardly be reconcilable with the fact that Article IX(2) reserves
the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the WTO Treaty to
165 DSU, supra note 109, art. 16(4) (stating that a panel report is adopted unless it
is rejected by consensus).
166 See Michael Lennard, Navigating By the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agree-
ments, 5 J. INT'L EcON. L. 17, 89 (2002).
167 FESTSCHRIFr FUR KOLLE UND STAUDER [WRITINGS IN HONOUR OF KOLLE AND
STAUDER], supra note 107, at 45, 47.168 Lennard, supra note 166, at 33 (pointing towards the WTO's lack of a formal
system of binding precedent" but also emphasizing that, in practical terms, "prior
decisions are not lightly departed from."); see also Final Act Embodying the Re-
sults of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations art. IX(2), Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
169 VCLT, supra note 44, arts. 31.3(a) & (b).
17o DSU, supra note 109, art. IV.3.
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the General Council and the Ministerial Conference, thereby requiring
a three-fourths majority, whereas the threshold for adoption of panel
reports is much lower - they can only be rejected by consensus. 171 As
a matter of principle, therefore, only agreements concluded through
formal WTO procedures for reaching an agreed interpretation are
qualifying for a subsequent agreement in the sense of the VCLT. 172
For similar reasons, there is also no point in contending that
panel reports establish "subsequent practice." 173 It is true that at
least in one case, Japan - Alcohol, the panel held that "panel reports
adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties and the WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Body constitute subsequent practice in a specific case."' 74
However, that view was rejected in the same case by the Appellate
Body.' 75 Although this led to some discussion in the literature, 76 the
Appellate Body's position appears correct in view of the fact that "sub-
sequent practice" in the meaning of Article 31(b) of the VCLT becomes
binding because, and insofar as, it establishes a (tacit) agreement be-
tween the parties on the point of interpretation. 1 77 As was pointed out
above, it cannot simply be submitted that WTO panel decisions fulfil
the requirements for such an agreement. As Michael Lennard puts it,
members may choose to agree, or not object to, a panel report because
they see it as "an appropriate solution to a particular dispute, but
without a recognition that [the panel's ruling] should govern the inter-
pretation on all the points addressed in future cases for all parties,
without the possibility of a point being re-litigated and argued more
fully."178
However, even when an "automatic" binding effect is denied, it
is very well possible that panel reports furnish the basis for the devel-
opment of subsequent practice in the Member States which, in the
longer run, might indeed become binding in the sense that it reflects a
common understanding as to what is the correct interpretation of a
given provision. 179 The risk with this approach seems to be that it
171 Final Act, supra note 168, art. IX(2).
172 See id.
173 VCLT, supra note 44, art. 31(b).
174 Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 12, WT/DS8/AB/
R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS1I/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
175 Id.
176 Lennard, supra note 166, at 18 (citing James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Prin-
ciples of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 50 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q 248, 252-53 (2001)).
177 Lennard, supra note 166, at 33.
178 Id. An even simpler explanation might be that Members choose not to object to
a panel report simply because they consider this a futile effort in view of the una-
nimity requirement for rejection.
179 Id. at 34.
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tends to involve a self-endorsing dynamism: if the authoritative qual-
ity of a panel report is basically taken for granted in Member States'
practice as well as in subsequent reports, this may, in the end, result
in a consolidated practice which appears to reflect a common agree-
ment, without alternative interpretations ever having been put to a
test. It is exactly for that reason that it is crucially important to raise
the general awareness concerning the possibility of taking a fresh ap-
proach instead of blindly reiterating what the panels have said.
b) Rulings by national courts
It is not possible in the present context to embark on a full in-
vestigation of the way the three-step test has been taken into account
by national courts (if at all), and whether an impact has become visible
of the restrictive tendencies tainting the panel reports. Only as exam-
ples, reference is made in the following to two decisions that seem to
mark two fundamentally different approaches towards the three-step
test.
The first of these decisions was handed down by the French
Supreme Court, concerning the application of technical protection
measures to a DVD.' s0 Buyers were thereby prevented from making
private copies, which is a legal form of use according to French copy-
right law. A claim for damages filed on the basis of Articles L.122-5
and L.211-3 of the French Intellectual Property Code by the French
consumer association and a consumer was granted by the Paris Appeal
court. The court found that, although private copying was an excep-
tion from copyright instead of a positive right granted to users, the
possibility to benefit from that exception could not be restricted unilat-
erally without an express legal basis."s However, the judgment was
vacated upon appeal to the French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassa-
tion). ' 2 It was held that the provisions in the Intellectual Property
Code had to be interpreted in the light of the three-step test, as incor-
porated in the Directive Number 2001/29/EU on the Harmonisation of
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in the Informa-
tion Society, and Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention.' 3 In the brief
manner which is typical for French decisions, the court laconically con-
cluded that,
the private copy exception in Articles L.122-5 and L.211-
3 of the Intellectual Property Code interpreted in the
light of the said European Directive cannot be used to
180 Cour de Cassation, supra note 39; see also Geiger, Balanced Copyright, supra
note 142.
181 See Cour de Cassation, supra note 39.
182 Id.; see also Geiger, Balanced Copyright, supra note 142.
183 See Cour de Cassation, supra note 39.
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prohibit technical measures intended to prevent the
making of copies being inserted on media reproducing a
protected work if such copying would have the effect of
conflicting with the normal exploitation of the work,
which must be determined by taking into account the ec-
onomic effect that such copying can have in the context
of the digital environment.1 8 4
The decision drew critical comments, not least because it seems
to interfere with the prerogative granted to legislation in the constitu-
tional system of continental European countries. It was feared that it
would mark the inception of a line of jurisprudence which would use
the three-step test as a trigger for supra-legislative screening of provi-
sions potentially limiting the stream of economic benefits accruing to
the right holder, even where explicit exceptions are set out in the
law. 185
By contrast to that, it was demonstrated in a recent decision by
the Barcelona Court of Appeals that the three-step test can be read in
a totally different manner.186 The case concerned the caching and
proxy-caching of content by Google for running its search engines.1 87
The right holder had argued that to allow such measures would run
counter to the black-letter text of the law and that it would be incom-
patible with Article 40bis of the Intellectual Property Law - Collected
Text (TRLPI), which contains a provision largely corresponding to the
three-step test.' 8 Against that, the court held that Article 40bis of the
TRPLI, ". . .which originally intended to be a hermeneutic criterion for
the interpretation of the statutory limits may allow that, by means of
interpretation, we question the boundaries of these rights beyond liter-
ary provisions which regulate them, in positive and in negative terms,
in this case the rights of reproduction and making available."189 And,
in an even more revolutionary spirit, the court continues: "[o]ur inter-
pretation of the scope of the intellectual property rights-which can
184 id.
185 A certain tendency to assign a sort of "supra-legal" quality to the three-step
test, making it binding for courts to observe the test even on top of express limita-
tions set out in the law, might be visible in the fact that several (European) coun-
tries have chosen to incorporate the wording of Article 13 of TRIPS (or rather
Directive 2001/29, supra note 7, art. 5(5)) into their copyright laws. "These states
include the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
Poland, Portugal and Slovakia," Hugenholtz & Okediji, supra note 17, at 18.
186 Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona, AC \2008 \ 1773, Sept. 17, 2008, available
at http :llwww. irpi. ccip. fr / upload / pdf/private / decisions / 080917 _ Audencia_
Barcelona GoogleSpain.pdf.
187 Id. at 2.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 7 (Quotation translation provided to author by R. Xalabarder).
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never be configured as absolute rights-and their limitiations should
be guided by what in Anglosaxon regimes is known as the fair use doc-
trine." 9 ' Last, it amounts to transposing the Real State doctrine for
ius usus inoqui into IP, as "a natural limit of property right which op-
erates on the whole when interpreting the scope of protection, in order
to avoid absurd results."1 9 ' Following that announcement, the court
then proceeds to apply the four factors mentioned in Section 107 of the
United States Copyright Act.19 2
In the context of continental European law, the approach taken
by the Barcelona Appeal court appears quite bold and, with a Supreme
Court decision still lacking on the issue, it might not fully reflect the
actual state of the law in Spain. Nevertheless, in its openness for a
pro-active approach towards balancing of interests, the decision is to
be welcomed. It certainly remains to be problematic also in this con-
text that the court considers itself free to disregard certain restrictions
that are set out in the written law. However, if such leeway should be
accepted at all, the additional room for discretion thus allowed for judi-
cial assessment must work both ways-also in the direction of grant-
ing more room for free use-instead of offering another tool for
strengthening the position of right holders, as would follow from the
one-sided approach endorsed by the French Supreme Court.
c) Revisiting the roots: Article 9.2 of the Berne Convention
As a background for the attempt to find a fresh approach to-
wards the meaning and implications of the three-step test, it may be
useful to revisit the circumstances under which Article 9.2 of the
Berne Convention, the "mother of all three-step tests" came into exis-
tence, and to compare those circumstances with the pertinent condi-
tions at the time of concluding the TRIPS agreement.' 9 3 It was
pointed out above that the decision taken at the Stockholm Conference
to include the reproduction right into the Berne Convention, while al-
lowing national legislatures to limit the right in "certain special cases",
was heavily tainted by the upcoming threat of mass-reproduction by
photocopying and other, similar devices. In that situation, it was of
vital importance to create a reliable international safeguard for au-
thors, to ensure their sole right to authorize and prohibit any such
acts, except for specific situations (primarily those which had been
found acceptable in the various legal traditions), where an authoriza-
tion by law would not substantially detract from their basic
entitlement.
190 Id. (Quotation translation provided to author by R. Xalabarder).
191 Id. (Quotation translation provided to author by R. Xalabarder).
192 See id. at 7-8.
193 Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 9.2.
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While the fathers of Article 9 of the Revised Berne Convention
(RBC) were certainly right in anticipating that the development of in-
creasingly sophisticated tools for easy copying would pose a serious
problem for the exclusive right of authors to their works, they could
not possibly have imagined the dimension which reproduction in the
larger sense has assumed only forty years later, with one single digital
copy being able to allow the perception of protected content worldwide,
and to become the source of, in theory, millions of other exact copies.
However, they could likewise not be aware of the enormous impor-
tance which unimpeded communication and access to protected con-
tent would gain in the information society. And of course, the famous
line coined by Charles Clark, "the answer to the machine is in the ma-
chine," '194 could not possibly have rung in their heads - that it would
be possible to bar access by technical protection measures, basically
irrespective of the existence and extent of the protection granted under
copyright, was inconceivable at the relevant time;' 95 it even did not
play a major role for the considerations in the Uruguay round when
Article 9.2 of the RBC was accepted as the blueprint for Article 13 of
TRIPS and the other provisions embedding similar clauses. 196
All those changes do not mean that Article 9.2 of the RBC as
well as Article 13 and the other provisions in TRIPS agreement should
not be interpreted in good faith according to their ordinary meaning,
as is prescribed by Article 31 of the VCLT. 19' However, the above con-
siderations do confirm that there is good reason today to explore the
room for flexibility the provision may hold. 198
d) Arguments derived from the TRIPS context.99
(i) Intellectual property as a trade related matter: "Property logic"
reversed
By restricting the possible range of limitations to "small dimi-
nutions" from a full exploitation of the IP right concerned, the panels
implicitly chose to follow an approach which, in the allegory used in
the beginning of this paper, treats limitations as "islands in a sea of
194 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 164, 170 (Stanford Univ. Press, rev. ed. 2003).
195 See Alexander Peukert, International Copyright Law and Proposals for Non-
Voluntary Licenses Regarding P2P File Sharing, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
ARTICLES ON CROSSING BORDERS BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND ACTUAL 439, 453-54
(F. Willem Grosheide & Jan J. Brinkkhof eds., 2004).
196 See Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 9.2; TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 13.
197 VCLT, supra note 44, art. 31.
198 See SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7, at 194.
199 See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 161-94 (Paul L.C.
Torremans ed., 2008).
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exclusivity." It was pointed out above that such an approach may in-
deed be called for in jurisdictions holding, for constitutional or other
grounds, that in case of doubt, whenever a right has been established,
property aspects must prevail over free access and use by others.
However, that kind of "property logic" is far from universally valid; it
only applies in systems that have opted for it. This is not the case
within the WTO system; rather, the reverse logic does - or should -
apply.
The fact that IP rights are expressly recognized as private
rights in the Preamble to the TRIPS agreement does not warrant an-
other finding.2 ° ° As private rights, IP rights are nevertheless subject
to those limitations that are an expression of the proper role assigned
to them by the objectives underlying the system within which they are
operating. Concerning the TRIPS agreement, those objectives are
spelled out in Article 7, where it is emphasized that IP rights are func-
tional tools with regard to promotion of innovation and transfer of
technology, as well as for the benefit of the public at large. 20 ' Accord-
ingly, mandatory protection exacted by TRIPS must be organized so as
to foster international trade relations instead of creating distortions
that may result from inefficient protection. One main example for the
latter is trade in counterfeit goods, but also other deficiencies may be
counted here that would jeopardize countries' investments in creation
and innovation. In other words, the yardstick to be employed with re-
gard to the minimum safeguards owed to IP rights in the framework of
TRIPS is that of (international) market failure. From that perspective,
it is neither necessary nor advisable to apply a property-biased ap-
proach. On the contrary, placing the accent on competition appears as
a more appropriate way of honoring the particular, trade-related objec-
tives which form the basis of the TRIPS agreement, as expressed in
Article 7.202
The Preamble to the TRIPS agreement itself offers strong sup-
port for that proposition. First, reference is made therein to the aim of
reducing "distortions and impediments to international trade", it being
added that IP should not itself become an impediment to international
trade.20 3 Moreover, the connotation of intellectual rights as private
200 TRIPS, supra note 1, pmbl.
201 Id. art. 7.
202 Id. It would probably go too far, however, to derive from this the view that a
general "reversal of proof" operates in favour of countries who want to make use of
the flexibilities offered by the TRIPS objectives and principles. Id. arts. 7 & 8. See
also, CORREA, infra note 235.
203 TRIPS, supra note 1, pmbl.
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rights is complimented by reference to the policy objectives on which it
is founded.2 "4
(ii) The Doha process and its impact on the interpretation of TRIPS
norms
The importance of interpreting the individual TRIPS agree-
ment provisions in light not only of Article 7, but also of the principles
embedded in Article 8, was raised beyond doubt in the framework of
the Doha process. In order to soothe the concerns raised by the out-
come of the Uruguay round in developing and threshold countries, the
current round of trade negotiations strives to adopt more development-
friendly policies. Those aims were set out in a Ministerial Declaration
adopted at the Fourth Ministerial Conference at Doha, Qatar, in No-
vember 2001.205 In the section dealing with incumbent issues for the
Doha round to address within the field of IP, 206 it was stated that "[i]n
undertaking these tasks, the TRIPS Council shall be guided by the
objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement and shall take fully into account the development
dimension.,207
The Ministerial Conference also issued a separate "Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health."20 8 In the parts that are
of foremost relevance for this topic, the declaration reads as follows:
204 Id. ("Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for
the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological
objectives." (emphasis added)). Another important qualification regarding the
consideration given to IPR as private rights in the framework of TRIPS follows
from the larger context of the WTO Agreement. See Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan,
A Comparative Analysis of Policy Space in the WTO, 53, available on SSRN, http:fl
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1309526. Inter alia, it is of specific
note in this regard that the Preamble to the WTO Agreement, deliberately deviat-
ing from the prior GATT text, makes reference to the objective of "sustainable de-
velopment." Final Act, supra note 168, pmbl.
205 World Trade Organizatoin, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001, WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [herinafter Doha Declaration].
206 Id. 17-19 (Discussing the issues of geographical indications review of Arti-
cle 27.3(b); review of the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement under Arti-
cle 71.1; examination of the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the
Convention on Biological Diversity; the protection of traditional knowledge and
folklore; and other relevant new developments raised by members pursuant to
Article 71.1).
207 Id. 19.
208 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health of 9-14 Nov. 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/minist_e/min0le/mindecltrips-e.pdf [herinafter Doha Declara-
tion on TRIPS and Publc Health].
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4. We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and
should not prevent members from taking measures to
protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the
Agreement can and should be interpreted and imple-
mented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right
to protect public health and, in particular, to promote ac-
cess to medicines for all.
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO mem-
bers to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.
5. Accordingly and in the light of paragraph 4 above,
while maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS
Agreement, we recognize that these flexibilities include:
5(a). In applying the customary rules of interpretation of
public international law, each provision of the TRIPS
Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and
purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in
its objectives and principles.2 °9
The effects ensuing from the Doha Declaration have been con-
sidered at length in the legal literature.2 10 It has been pointed out 2 1 1
that the paragraph is stated in the form of an agreement, and that
"(s)ince this statement was adopted by consensus by the Minis-
ters... this may be interpreted as a 'decision' of the members under
Article IX.1 of the WTO Agreement,"2 12 which for all practical pur-
poses comes very close to an "interpretation" in the meaning of Article
IX.2. Furthermore, with a view to paragraph 5(a) invoking the cus-
tomary rules of public international law, it is held that "[b]y particu-
larizing reference to objectives and principles, the Declaration appears
indirectly to reference Articles 7 and 8 and this may have the effect of
elevating those provisions above the preamble of TRIPS for interpreta-
tive purposes."21 3 The latter effect is considered as important, in view
of the possibility that the preamble "might be understood to place a
somewhat greater weight on the interests of intellectual property own-
ers than on public interests."21 "
209 Id. arts. 4-5(a).
21o Ruse-Khan, supra note 204, at 44.
211 See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 78, at 131.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 132.
214 Id. at 132 n.292. However, as was pointed out above, that statement must
already be qualified in view of the objectives stated in the preamble, and also tak-
ing into account the larger WTO context.
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Even more importantly for these considerations, it is pointed
out by Daniel Gervais that after Articles 7 and 8 have been singled out
as having a special importance in the Doha Ministerial Declaration,
"[an argument could be made that these provisions now have higher
legal status . ..in the context of, e.g., dispute-settlement proceed-
ings."21 5 Though the formal status of the provisions was not changed
in the Doha process, "[t]he impact of the Doha Declaration ... could
convince a panel to take a longer look at how these provisions should be
interpreted in the context of the Agreement as a whole. 216
In brief, although the Doha Declaration has not given Member
States carte blanche to set aside the obligations under the TRIPS
agreement in order to promote the policy concerns mentioned in Arti-
cle 8.1, it has unmistakably reaffirmed the freedom of Members to ad-
dress health (and other) concerns in the framework of the flexibilities
that the TRIPS agreement may offer.
(iii) The proportionality principle as an inherent feature of the WTO
system
For a full evaluation of those flexibilities, and the manner in
which they can be used, it needs to be remembered that TRIPS is but a
part of the larger WTO system, whose rules are reflecting upon the
overarching principles to be followed. Particular relevance in that re-
gard must be attributed to Article XX of GATT, and the principles gov-
erning its application.217 As is pointed out in more detail by Ruse-
Khan, it is true that Article 8.1 of the TRIPS agreement was deliber-
ately formulated to make a difference vis-&-vis Article XX of GATT.218
Whereas the test embedded in the latter provision may even justify
measures derogating from the obligations under the WTO Agreement,
Article 8.1 of the TRIPS agreement has been 'emasculated' to ensure
215 DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
122 (Sweet & Maxwell 3d ed., 2003).
216 DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
211 (Sweet & Maxwell 3d ed., 2008); see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREE-
MENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 121 (Sweet & Maxwell 2d ed., 2003) (argu-
ing that "this Article [Article 8] may serve as a bsis for broader exceptions than the
previous one [Article 71"). This leaves unaffected the basic position that to take
the principles and objectives into account may not lead to results that would
amount to renegotiation of the agreement. This resolves from the second clause in
paragraph four of the Doha Declaration, which only refers to the present flexibili-
ties provided by TRIPS. See Doha Declaration, supra note 205, 4.
217 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
218 Ruse-Khan, supra note 204, at 20.
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that the mandatory character of the TRIPS agreement provisions re-
mains unchallenged.2 1 9
Nevertheless, the concept on which Article XX of GATT is
founded and the way in which it has come to be interpreted in WTO
disputes remain to be relevant where the TRIPS agreement leaves
space for policy considerations. This is typically the case where provi-
sions contain broad, "open" notions that must be filled and interpreted
in the light of value-based judgments, such as e.g. terms like "unrea-
sonable" or "legitimate."2 2 ° In those instances, the balancing exercise
undertaken in the framework of Article XX of GATT offers a model
which is appropriate also for the TRIPS agreement context.2 2 '
Under Article XX of GATT (and Article XIV of GATS) 22 2 , the
test regularly evolves in a two-tier fashion. First, it is asked whether
the measure at stake is "necessary" in view of the policy objective it is
intended to serve.2 2 3 If the first step can be cleared, it is further asked
whether the measure constitutes an abuse, e.g. because it unduly dis-
criminates between Members, or otherwise constitutes a disguised
barrier to free trade. 224 Both elements of the test essentially involve a
weighing of different factors that are set in proportion to each other.2 2 5
As was pointed out by the Appellate Body in Korea - Beef, these factors
regularly include: (a) the contribution made by the measure at stake to
the legal goal aspired by the law or regulation at issue; (b) the impor-
tance of the common interest or values protected by that law or regula-
tion; and (c) the ensuing impact of the law or regulation on the
protected interests in free trade, i.e. on imports or exports.2 26 If a cor-
responding scheme is applied to the three-step test, this means that:
(a) the appropriateness of the limitation for achieving its purpose; (b)
219 Id. at 18 (citing Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Product WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter
Shrimp Appellate Report]).
220 See Ruse-Khan, supra note 204, at 34-35, 44.
221 GATT, supra note 217, art. XX.
222 General Agreement on Trade in Services art. II, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125
[hereinafter GATS].
223 GATT, supra note 217, art. XX. It is important to note in this context that
.necessary" does not mean "indispensable," but is interpreted with the aim to pre-
serve Members' freedom to achieve their own regulatory objectives. See Working
Party on Domestic Regulation, Annual Report Of The Working Party On Domestic
Regulation To The Council For Trade In Services, S/WPDR/W/27 (Nov. 26, 2004).
224 The second element of the test is informed by Article XX of the GATT. GATT,
supra note 217, art. XX.
225 See Ruse-Khan, supra note 204, at 60.
226 Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef WT/DS161/AB/R 164 (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Beef Appellate
Report].
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the importance of the policy concerns pursued thereby; and (c) the im-
pact it produces on the interests of right holders need to be weighed
and balanced against each other. The more vital or important the soci-
etal value at issue, the easier the measure will be considered legiti-
mate.227 Of course, it must be kept in mind that the TRIPS agreement
provisions remain to be binding, so that limitations will in any case
fall afoul of the test if they cross the "red line" of the minimum protec-
tion level guaranteed by the TRIPS agreement provisions. Further-
more, just like under Article XX of GATT, limitations are inadmissible
if they constitute abuse in the light of general trade policy-by unduly
discriminating between Member States.228
The need to interpret the three-step test in the light of propor-
tionality considerations cannot be emphasized strongly enough.229
Only in this way will it be possible to respect Member States' breath-
ing space and the different conditions under which domestic IP sys-
tems are operating, while at the same time maintaining a sufficient
level of minimum protection and legal security.
It hardly needs to be emphasized that the proportionality ap-
proach stands in stark contrast to the WTO panels' narrow focus on
the economic impact of the limitations, as measured in absolute terms.
While the deficiencies of the panels' reasoning are particularly obvious
with regard to clearly value-based notions like "unreasonable" and "le-
gitimate", the impact of the different approach endorsed here goes
even further than that. As was pointed out above, the essential crite-
ria addressed on the first and second step (that exceptions must be of
"limited extent" and must not be in conflict with "normal" exploitation)
are of a gradual rather than of an absolute character - limitations and
exceptions can be of a more or less limited content and impact, and
normal exploitation of a right figures somewhere on a scale between
full exclusivity and the grant of a market position which in spite of
certain restrictions is sufficient to prevent market failure. Just like
the reasonableness and legitimacy of measures taken, their normalcy
and limited character need to be measured in relation to the interests
and policies pursued, with the final test being to assess whether in
view of the weight of those interests, the limitation is proportionate,
i.e. does not go further than what is needed to achieve the purpose,
227 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting As-
bestos and Products Containing Asbestos WT/DS135/AB/R 174 (Mar. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter Asbestos Appellate Report].
228 See GATT, supra note 217, art. XX (The latter requirement echoes the abuse
clause regularly considered under this article).
229 That a proportionality test should apply is also advocated strongly by Senf-
tleben. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7, at 226.
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while respecting the demarcations identifying the absolute minimum
protection guaranteed by TRIPS.
6. Rgsumd and consequences: Guidelines for interpreting the three-
step test(s) in TRIPS
a) The basic principles
It follows from the above considerations that an interpretation
of the three-step test must respect the following principles:
- First, it is incompatible with the specific context of the-
TRIPS agreement to apply a scheme of "property logic." In
other words, to consider IP as a self-sufficient aim that must
be safeguarded to the fullest degree possible.
- Second, it is crucial to pay attention to the objects and prin-
ciples of the TRIPS agreement whenever the admissibility of
limitations is at stake.
- Third, and probably most importantly, the assessment must
always involve a balancing effort based on the principle of
proportionality. The gravity of limitations must be mea-
sured against the importance of the objectives on which they
are founded.
b) Reconstructing the scheme underlying the three-step test
In the light of these principles, the structure of the three-step
test needs to be re-evaluated. This concerns in particular the thesis
endorsed by the WTO panels that all three steps are separate from
each other and must be passed subsequently and cumulatively. Based
on that structure, limitations may e.g. fail the first step for purely
quantitative reasons, without any account being taken of the policy
aspects on which they are founded.2 3 ° A "policy-blind" assessment like
that would necessarily clash with the fundamental principles pointed
out above.
As a matter of principle, such effects could be avoided by un-
dertaking a comprehensive balancing exercise within each one of the
three steps, thereby necessarily creating a high degree of redundancy.
In order to avoid such effects, but nevertheless providing for a full and
comprehensive evaluation, the interpretation must proceed from the
understanding that instead of constituting three separate units, the
three steps are nothing but individual elements informing one overall
assessment.2 3 '
In practice, this results in the following scheme:
230 See supra Part V.4.b(i).
231 See Declaration, A Balanced Interpretation of the "Three-Step Test" in Copy-
right Law, 39 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707 (2008).
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- On the first step, the situations covered by the limitation are
identified. How broad or narrow is the rule, and how much
legal certainty does it provide?
- On the second step, the economic consequences are ana-
lyzed. In order to avoid a one-sided approach, the analysis
should consider both extremes. To what extent the limita-
tion restricts the fullest possible way of exploitation (taking
account of actual as well as potential markets), but also
whether it still leaves sufficient incentives for right holders
(and the respective countries) to invest in innovative or cre-
ative activities, in other words, to prevent market failure on
the national or international level.
- On the third step, the conflicting interests of the affected
groups of right holders2 32 and those of third parties as well
as of the public are identified and evaluated in the light of
the policies on which they are based. In order to secure a
truly balanced form of protection in accordance with the
prime objective of the TRIPS agreement, such an exercise is
mandatory in all fields of IP-including copyright.
- Finally, deriving from the proportionality principle as an in-
herent feature of GATT/TRIPS, the general guideline com-
manding the overall assessment must be that a limitation is
admissible where the same policy objective could not be
achieved by lesser means (where a limitation is "limited
enough" for its purpose, and does not restrict exploitation
more than necessary),233 provided that it does not result in
discrimination or otherwise entail unacceptable effects.
c) A presumption in favour of "freedom"?
Considering that the philosophy underlying TRIPS as a trade-
related instrument is in favour of free competition rather than its re-
striction,234 it seems logical that the proponents of a limitation should
be given the benefit of doubt, if the assessment undertaken on the ba-
232 Other than what might be suggested by the wording of the three-step test, the
interests of right holders are not always homogeneous and necessarily opposed to
those of the users. For instance, in copyright it may occur in certain situations
that the interests of authors (the personal creators), in an optimal dissemination
of their works concur with the interests of users in getting access to those works,
while they conflict with the interests of (derivative) right holders who want to se-
cure their revenues by safeguarding exclusivity. In such situations, the interests
of all parties involved have to be taken into account, instead of solely focusing on
one group. See id (discussing these aspects of the three-step test in detail).
233 See Ruse-Khan, supra note 204, at 56-57.
234 See supra Part V.5.d(i).
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sis of the three steps should lead to inconclusive results. It might even
be asked whether a presumption should operate in favour of the legiti-
macy of limitations, unless a clear preponderance of the evidence is
brought against it. Similar to this, the argument has been made in a
different context that at least when a legal rule is based on the princi-
ples expressly mentioned in Article 8, it should be presumed admissi-
ble unless it is established to the conviction of a WTO panel that the
provision falls foul of legal obligations resulting from TRIPS Part 1.235
However, to postulate such a presumption appears to reverse the
meaning usually attributed to the wording of provisions construed like
Article 8. By stipulating that the objectives mentioned therein may be
pursued, "provided that" this does not conflict with other parts of the
convention, the burden to establish compatibility with those other
norms is regularly placed on the party raising the argument as a
defence.
The same line of reasoning would apply to the suggestion made
with regard to a presumption in favour of limitations. However, as
was pointed out in the beginning of this paper,23 6 the procedural as-
pect of where to place the burden of pleading and adducing evidence
needs to be distinguished from the spirit in which the assessment of
legal issues is undertaken. With regard to that latter aspect, the
wording of Article 8 does not appear to constitute an obstacle against a
competition-friendly interpretation of the three-step test.
7. Other (copyright) conventions - Will the problems persist outside
TRIPS?
a) Background
Reconsidering the structure and meaning of the three-step test
in the framework of TRIPS may not necessarily resolve the problems
accruing in other instruments embedding the same or similar provi-
sions. Until now, the issue only concerns copyright and related rights:
the Berne Convention contains the three-step test in its original form
alongside with its forerunner, the minor reservations doctrine, and
other explicit limitations. Those provisions are also firmly linked with
TRIPS, as the Berne aquis has become an integral part of that conven-
tion by virtue of Article 9.1. In addition, the three-step test was incor-
porated in the two post-TRIPS instruments, WCT and WPPT.
The following lines do not undertake to examine the complex
relations between those instruments in their entirety, 237 but are only
concentrated on the question whether the interpretation proposed
235 See CARLOS CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 200 (2007) (regarding measures allegedly violating Article 20 TRIPS).
236 See supra Part 11.3.
237 See WIPO Study, supra note 9, at 46.
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above can be applied to the three-step test where it appears in other
instruments, or whether a stricter interpretation would be warranted
in such cases.
b) The Berne Convention
(i) Article 9.2
In its capacity of being part of the Berne Convention, Article
9.2 RBC is not subject to the above interpretation inasfar as argu-
ments were derived from the specific objectives and context of TRIPS.
A different view might apply, however, to the extent that Article 9.2
has been incorporated into TRIPS. The difference might be relevant
not least in view of the fact that only in its latter capacity will the
provision possibly come into the focus of WTO panel proceedings.
The position that the examination of Article 9.2 RBC in the
framework of WTO Dispute Settlement proceedings should be confined
to trade related aspects might be supported by the argument that
moral rights-which do form part of the test in Article 9.2 RBC-can
hardly be taken into account by a panel. On the other hand, that con-
sequence follows from the explicit reservation made with regard to
moral rights in Article 9(1) TRIPS, whereas to ignore other possible
implications of Article 9.2 RBC in favour of a strictly trade-oriented
approach does not find support anywhere in TRIPS. It follows logi-
cally that the incorporation of Article 9.2 RBC into TRIPS has not in-
fluenced the ambit of that provision other than by excluding moral
rights aspects from consideration for purposes of dispute settlement.
It is therefore correctly pointed out by Senftleben that it would be mis-
guided to reason that after inclusion of the three-step test in TRIPS,
limitations and exceptions could be accepted that go beyond what was
formerly considered admissible under the Berne Convention. 238 Pur-
suant to Article 20 RBC, which has become part of TRIPS by virtue of
Article 9.1, agreements concluded between Members may only deviate
from the rules anchored in the Convention to the extent that they
grant a more favourable position to authors.239 That being said, it is
nevertheless unlikely that an independent analysis of Article 9.2 RBC
would lead to conspicuously different results than what has been ar-
gued before with regard to TRIPS.
It needs to be considered, first, that if the TRIPS context is re-
moved as a basis for interpreting Article 9.2 RBC, there is even less
reason to conclude that the ordinary meaning of the word "special" in
the first step of the test is a synonym with "narrow," denoting a "small
238 SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7, at 88-89; see also GERVAIS, supra note 215, at 237.
239 SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7, at 88 (stating that it would not be a tenable argu-
ment to claim that it therefore does not apply to the rules embodied in multilateral
agreements such as TRIPS).
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diminution" instead of "having a specific purpose" or "precise. "1 4° It
was only by referencing the patent panels' exegesis of the term "lim-
ited exception" that the copyright panel arrived at its conclusion.2 4 1 In
this context, it is interesting to note what Ricketson has suggested as
the meaning of "certain special cases" in his pre-TRIPS commentary to
the Berne Convention (1886-1986): "First, the use in question must be
for a quite specific purpose" (emphasis added).2 4 2 Also, the argument
that the analysis of the second step is incomplete unless normative
considerations are taken into account is derived from legal thinking
independent of TRIPS.2 4 3 Finally, to the extent that certain interests
are privileged on the third step, this only applies to authors and is not
to be applied in favour of right holders in general. Accordingly, where
the personal interests of authors would benefit from a limita-
tion-typically because it contributes to the dissemination of their
works, and/or they are entitled to fair remuneration in exchange-the
fact that losses might be sustained by derivative right holders would
obviously not be able to jeopardize its admissibility.
(ii) Article 11bis and the minor reservations doctrine
In pre-Stockholm days, Berne members' ability to introduce
limitations had only been subject to the minor reservations doctrine.
The existence of that de minimis threshold had been expressly ac-
knowledged in the course of the Brussels Revision Conference, where
it became topical in regard to the right to public performance.2 4 4
It is generally accepted that the minor reservations doctrine
has not become obsolete by adoption of the three-step test in TRIPS.
As emphasized by the panel in USA - Copyright, nothing in the TRIPS
negotiations suggests that members wanted to refrain from incorpo-
rating that specific part of the Berne aquis.24" The issue was of some
relevance for the case at stake, which concerned an aspect of the
broadcasting right that did not appear to be covered by the specific
exceptions mentioned in Article llbis RBC. Confirming the applicabil-
ity of the minor reservations doctrine in principle, the panel then em-
240 Copyright Panel Report, supra note 101, 6.109.
241 Id. TT 6.227-6.228.
242 SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY
AND ARTISTIC WORKS 1886-1986 482 (Longman, 1989) (stating that "a broad kind
of limitation would not be justified. Secondly, there must be something 'special'
about this purpose; 'special' here meaning that it is justified by some clear reason
of public policy or some other exceptional circumstance" as he has later-on given
up his position and agrees with the position taken by Jane Ginsburg that a norma-
tive assessment has no place on the first step.) (See infra Part V.4.b(i)).
243 WIPO Study, supra note 9, at 25.
244 See supra Parts V.2; Copyright Panel Report, supra note 101, T 6.42-6.70.
245 Copyright Panel Report, supra note 101, 6.68-6.70.
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ployed the three-step test as a way to clarify its meaning for the case
concerned;24 6 it treated Article 13 as a concretisation of the older
doctrine.
The reasoning provided a way out of the problem that Article
libis RBC, although allowing for a quite severe reduction of the right
to control public performance in certain cases, does so only under the
condition that fair remuneration is paid (and moral rights are
respected).247 As the United States provision in question did not fore-
see anything like that, the only way to reconcile it with Article llbis
was to invoke the minor reservations doctrine. By aligning the reach
of the older doctrine with that of the three-step test, the panel avoided
a discussion of the consequences ensuing from the possibility that Arti-
cle 13 basically might allow for more than just de minimis excep-
tions.24 ' Before this backdrop, the reluctance of the copyright panel to
accept anything but the most insignificant detraction from a full ex-
ploitation becomes more explicable. Unfortunately, however, by the
panel's reaction to the specific constellation in the case at hand, the
minor reservations doctrine was effectively enthroned as the ultimate
yardstick governing the three-step test in all areas of copyright.
Some reason for this might even be found in the fact that in the
framework of the Berne Convention, the minor reservation, although
only having been articulated with respect to the public performance
(and, to some extent, the translation) right,24 9 apparently constituted
a sort of general default rule in case that no express limitations were
set out in the Convention. Considering that the Berne aquis forms a
minimum standard that remains to be binding for subsequent conven-
tions (including TRIPS),2 5 ° it would be logical to assume that even if it
had been the original purpose of the three-step test to function as an
enabling clause providing for more space to tailor exceptions and limi-
tations, this would not have been possible, as Article 20 RBC only per-
mits more extensive protection being granted. Consequently, it would
mean that the minor reservations doctrine remains to be binding at
least for rights that had already been granted under the Berne system.
However, a more relaxed view is apparently taken by Sam Ricketson,
when he declares that the copyright panel erred in considering itself
bound by the minor reservations doctrine, arguing that the latter only
246 Id. 6.69.
247 Id. 6.83.
248 REINBOTHE & LEWINKI, supra note 10, at 131.
249 In the materials for the Brussels conference, examples for the application are
also given regarding the translation right. No indication can be found in the mate-
rial that the application of the doctrine should be confined to those two fields.
250 SENFTLEBEN, supra note 7, at 88 (arguing that the three-step test in TRIPS is a
genuine Berne-plus element as Article 20 has become part of TRIPS by virtue of
Article 9(1)).
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represents a subset of what may be admissible under the three-step
test.2 5 '
Debates on the relevance of the minor reservations doctrine
regularly suffer from the fact that it is unclear what its scope and con-
tents actually are.2 5 2 It seems to be clear, however, that with regard
to the public performance right, the room for maneuver under the
three-step test for introducing limitations without remuneration is in-
deed rather narrow. However, to conclude that every interpretation of
the three-step test must necessarily adopt the same kind of de minimis
approach would be overstating the possible effects of the minor reser-
vations doctrine. Even in its core area of application-public perform-
ances-and much more so in other areas of copyright, its contours
were and are so vague that it cannot possibly furnish a distinct basis
for interpreting, and possibly limiting, the ambit of the three-step test
at large.2 5 3 In the documents for the Brussels Revision Conference,
where the only explicit discussion of the minor reservations doctrine
can be found, a number of examples are cited of admissible forms of
public performance in various legislations. It is not suggested in any
manner that the list of examples should be exclusive, let alone that it
should also be regarded as furnishing mandatory guidelines to be ob-
served in other potential fields of application.2 5 4 The only conclusion
to be derived from these considerations is that the minor reservations
doctrine is an open-ended tool providing for some degree of flexibility,
without thereby leaving IP rights at the disposal of domestic legisla-
tures. Based on that reasoning, it follows that the doctrine as such
cannot be considered as forming an institutional bar against a flexible
interpretation of the three-step test. In particular, no such restrictions
are warranted in cases when (by contrast to what has been the case in
USA - Copyright), right holders are offered fair remuneration in order
to compensate for permitted uses.
c) WCT and WPPT
The two WIPO treaties concluded in 1996 on the protection of
copyright,2 5 5 and the protection of performing artists and phonogram
producers, 25 6 were motivated by the desire to establish a common in-
251 WIPO Study, supra note 9, at 54.
252 RIcKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 833.
253 As was remarked by M. Plaisant as the Rapporteur-Gdn6ral for the Brussels
revision Conference, the only area besides public performances that seemed to
play a role at that time was the translation right. WIPO, Standing Committee on
Copyright and Related Rights, SCCR/9/7 (Apr. 5, 2003).
254 RICKETSON, supra note 242, at 536; see also RIcKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note
2, at 835.
255 WCT, supra note 68.
256 WPPT, supra note 99.
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ternational basis for addressing the challenges posed by the digital en-
vironment. They are therefore rather technology-driven than being
trade-oriented, like TRIPS. As is documented by the amazingly brief
period between the point in time when the "digital agenda" was first
tabled (September 1995) and the adoption of the treaties in December
1996, the proceedings evolved in unusual haste. Being under the per-
ception that the new technological developments provided an existen-
tial threat to the rights of authors and other right holders, a strong
urge was felt to react quickly, in spite of warnings that to do so might
be premature.257 In line with its history, the spirit underlying the
treaties is unmistakably assertive. Nevertheless, the need for a dy-
namic and flexible reading of the treaty also in respect of the limita-
tions and exceptions is accentuated by the Agreed Statement to Article
10 WCT,2 51 where it is stipulated that "the provisions of Article 10
permit Contracting Parties to carry forward and appropriately extend
into the digital environment limitations and exceptions... which have
been considered legitimate under the Berne Convention (and)... to de-
vise new limitations and exceptions that are appropriate in the digital
network environment". It is true that the clause remains closely
linked to the spirit and confines of the Berne Convention and therefore
cannot be understood as giving carte blanche to the introduction of
novel and potentially far-reaching limitations. 259 Nevertheless, it sig-
nals a certain openness, which is further underlined by the fifth resp.
fourth recital in the preamble of the WCT and WPPT, where reference
is made (similar to TRIPS) to the "need to maintain a balance between
the rights of authors (resp. performers and producers of phonograms)
and the larger public interest, particularly education, research and ac-
cess to information".260 Hence, as was argued above with regard to
Article 13 TRIPS, the interpretation of the three-step test in both trea-
257 REINBOTHE & LEWINSKI, supra note 10, at 6-7.
258 WCT, supra note 68, art. 4.
259 REINBOTHE & LEWINSKI, supra note 10, at 132 (arguing that the three-step
test, when applied under Article 10(2) "does not by itself invite, or even create, new
limitations and exceptions" (emphasis in the original); it is "a scrutiny test, but no
enabling clause").
260 WCT, supra note 68, at 2 (stating that in the Preamble, the sentence continues
"as reflected in the Berne Convention"); see also REINBOTHE & LEWINSKI, supra
note 10, at 22 (the reference was inserted in order to soothe concerns regarding the
fact that "access to information" might be understood in an overly broad manner:
by referencing the Berne Convention, it should be clarified that "access to informa-
tion" already is one of the justifications for limitations mentioned there, and
should be understood accordingly).
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ties cannot be policy-blind, but must include a comprehensive balanc-
ing of the various interests involved.2 6 '
This conclusion remains unaffected by the fact that, as empha-
sized in the literature, the terms "rights" and "interests" were explic-
itly chosen in the WCT preamble so as to clearly mark a difference in
the legal status of right holders as compared to the general public.2" 2
Even if it should have been the intention with that wording to imbue
the balancing exercise with a certain prejudice in favour of right hold-
ers,2 6 3 this would influence the interpretation of the three-step test
only in so far as it has found expression in the actual wording.26 4 How-
ever, in an ordinary understanding, the juxtaposition of "rights" and
"interests" does not convey the message that the latter are generally
inferior to the former. The use of different terms rather serves to de-
note the "technical" fact that the former are specifically regulated,
while the latter notion is broader than that.
One might further ask whether the reinforcement by the Doha
Declaration of the general objectives underlying IP right protection on
the international level must impact the WIPO treaties as well, given
the fact that all member countries adhering to those treaties are at the
same time also members of the WTO. On the other hand, to simply
assume that the Doha Declaration should be valid outside the institu-
tional framework in which it was formulated would hardly appear a
tenable position. Even without that additional foundation, however,
the interpretation suggested above remains the same to the extent it
was motivated by doubts concerning the consistency and internal logic
of the WTO-panels' reasoning.
261 SENTFLEBEN, supra note 7, at 98 (emphasizing the importance of the WCT pre-
amble for an appropriate interpretation of the three-step test in the digital
environment).
262 REINBOTHE & LEWINSKI, supra note 10, at 22 (stating that the original proposal
made by India during the Diplomatic Conference to make reference to ensuring 'a
balance between the interest of authors and the larger public' was accepted only
under the condition that that the word 'interests' (of authors) was replaced by the
word 'rights' in order state the difference between the status of authors and the
general public); see also id.at 24 (where the authors point out that the distinction
made between rights (authors) and interests (the public at large) "reflects the rela-
tionship between them, ie the relationship of'rule and exceptions'").
263 REINBOTHE & LEWINSKI, supra note 10, at 22 (stating that another attempt to
reduce the potential impact of the fifth preamble on the interpretation of the WCT
was further made by inserting recital four, which emphasizes the "outstanding
significance of copyright protection as an incentive for literary and artistic
creation).
264 VCLT, supra note 44, art. 31; see Lennard, supra note 166, at 21 ("[W]hat is
being sought is essentially... the 'expressed intent' rather than the 'subjective in-
tent' of the parties").
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Whether a more restrictive interpretation of the two WIPO
treaties is nevertheless warranted in view of their specific aims and
context, is very difficult to ascertain. As the two treaties do not form
an element of the WTO system and will therefore not be considered in
panel proceedings, the topic will probably never be raised before an
international body, and hence it may become moot in practice.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
With the texture of international IP protection becoming in-
creasingly dense, it appears natural and necessary that more attention
is focused on limitations and exceptions. The major part of the inter-
est is commanded by the three-step test, in particular Article 13
TRIPS, but initiatives are also forming which address the issue from a
different angle, by exploring the topic at large, like in the studies by
Ricketson and Hugenholtz & Okediji, and also by insisting that limita-
tions and exceptions, possibly in the form of mandatory rules,26 5
should be on the international agenda, e.g. in the framework of WIPO.
In the publications and initiatives dealing with the three-step
test, the critical voices prevail.26 Like in this paper, the panels' rea-
soning is frequently considered dissatisfactory and one-sided. The
misgivings are augmented by the fact that the test has been included
into national and regional instruments. What is meant as an alert to
courts and legislatures to the fact that international norms must be
respected, could easily turn out to entail adverse effects if it is misun-
derstood so as to disallow anything but the smallest inroad into a right
holder's exclusive market position. It should be the foremost aim of
scientific studies undertaken in that field to prevent such
understandings.
Going one step further, the Declaration on the Three Step Test,
which was elaborated in the framework of a project conducted jointly
by the Max-Planck-Institute and Queen Mary College, offers concrete
guidelines for a balanced interpretation of the three-step test.26 7 In
accordance with what was pointed out in this paper, the Declaration
emphasizes that the test must be considered as an indivisible entirety,
meaning that the individual steps are not cumulative in the sense that
each one must be passed separately, but that all of them need to be
comprised in an overall evaluation. Apart from that, the Declaration,
265 Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Enough is Enough - The Notion of
Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection (Max Planck
Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition & Tax Law Resarch Paper Series No. 09-
01), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326429 (discussing mandatory rules
and proposals presently pending in that regard).
266 See supra note 81.
267 Declaration, supra note 231.
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rather than giving a positive interpretation, points out in which way
the individual criteria should not be understood.
The approach endorsed here complies with the Declaration in
most or all aspects. However, it reaches beyond that initiative in sev-
eral regards. First, whereas the Declaration is only concerned with
copyright, the present endeavor undertakes to identify a general
scheme underlying the three-step test in all areas of IP alike. Second,
instead of pointing out how the three-step test should not be inter-
preted, a positive approach is undertaken, in order to show how the
interpretation should proceed. A basis for that, still following closely
the structure and wording of the three-step test, was laid out above.2 6
268 International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in
Intellectual Property, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, Synopsis of Orginial Version and Proposals for Amendment (2006),
http ://www. atrip .org/upload/files/activities/Parma2006/Kur%20synopsis. pdf; see
also International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in
Intellectual Property, TRIPS Amendments (2006), http://www.atrip.org/upload/
files/activities/Parma2006/Kur%20AMENDMENT.pdf.
